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THE MYTH OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY:
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
SANDRA GUERRA*
As the nation redoubles its efforts to fight crime, federal and
state cooperation in law enforcement becomes more commonplace
One by-product of such integrated operations is the increased
possibility of successive state and federal prosecutions for multiple
offenses arising from the same criminal act. Such prosecutions are
often justified under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine by which each
sovereign retains the right to enforce its own laws.
In this Article, Professor Sandra Guerra challenges the ap-
plicability of the dual sovereignty doctrine when successive
prosecutions follow highly integrated federal and state enforcement
efforts. Noting both the "federalization" of crimes traditionally
enforced at the state level and the close cooperation of federal and
state activities in the "war on drugs," Professor Guerra argues that,
at least in the field of law enforcement, ours is no longer a nation
of separate sovereigns. Professor Guerra concludes by observing
that, as currently interpreted, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment is powerless to prevent successive prosecutions
following what is arguably a single offense.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal trial of the police officers who beat Rodney King in
Los Angeles, following their acquittals on state charges and the
ensuing riots in South Central Los Angeles, cast a bright light on the
issue of successive federal-state prosecutions for offenses arising out
of the same act or transaction.' In run-of-the-mill drug cases,
however, such multiple prosecutions regularly pass without notice.
Consider the facts of United States v. Davis,2 for example. In
Albany, New York, federal, state, and local law enforcement joined
1. A number of law review articles have addressed the issue as it relates to the King
trial. See Robert C. Gorman, The Second Rodney King Trial: Justice in Jeopardy?, 27
AKRON L. REV. 57 (1993); Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual
Sovereignty, Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609 (1994); Paul Hoffman,
Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights "Exception", 41 UCLA L. REV. 649
(1994); Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The
Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509 (1994).
2. 906 F.2d 829 (2nd Cir. 1990).
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together to form the Capital District Drug Enforcement Task Force.
"State and local officers assigned to the Task Force [were] deputized
as Special Deputy United States Marshals and operate[d] under the
direct control and supervision of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). [Task Force members] follow[ed] DEA
policies and procedures."3 In January 1988, the Task Force arrested
Davis and two others for selling cocaine to an undercover officer. All
three defendants were indicted for violating state narcotics and
weapons laws.' On March 2, 1989, the Greene County Court ruled
to suppress the evidence against the defendants because the arresting
officers did not have reasonable cause to stop the car. Without this
evidence, the state prosecution could not go forward. Rather than
appeal the ruling, the District Attorney simply moved to dismiss the
charges and notified the federal authorities of the outcome. Federal
prosecutors obtained an indictment on May 18, 1989 on narcotics and
weapons charges based on the same drug sale.5 The Second Circuit,
following Supreme Court precedent, upheld the propriety of the
federal prosecution.6
Ordinarily, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
prohibits a government from prosecuting an individual twice for the
same offense.7 Successive and dual federal-state prosecutions,
8
however, involve two governments-a distinction that makes all the
difference to the Supreme Court. The "dual sovereignty" doctrine
approves successive federal-state prosecutions even for offenses
consisting of identical elements on the theory that each sovereign is
entitled to enforce its laws and may not be barred by a previous
prosecution in another jurisdiction.
This rule has been roundly criticized-and, arguably, for good
reason-on many different grounds.9 The dual sovereignty exception
3. Id. at 831.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 832-35.
7. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. A successive prosecution, for purposes of this Article, is defined as a second
prosecution that follows completion of the first. Dual prosecutions are two prosecutions
brought simultaneously in different jurisdictions. See also infra notes 157-67 and
accompanying text for a discussion of unique practical difficulties of representing a
defendant in dual prosecutions.
9. See generally Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting
Successive Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1992)
(proposing limitation on the dual-sovereignty exception); Walter T. Fisher, Double
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violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
It also violates any common-sense interpretation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause as a provision of the Bill of Rights, which was
intended to protect individual rights and liberties.10
This Article does not intend to suggest modification or abolition
of the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. The Supreme Court has made
perfectly clear that it will continue to permit successive and dual
prosecutions by the federal government and the states for crimes
arising out of the same conduct." Rather, this Article examines only
the inappropriateness of applying the doctrine in cases involving
multijurisdictional drug task forces.1" The Article compares the
Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1961)
(suggesting that the common law prohibited successive prosecutions); J.A.C. Grant, The
Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1309, 1331 (1932) (suggesting
that the rule would "fritter away our liberties upon the metaphysical subtlety" of two
sovereignties (paraphrasing Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 1, 64 (1820) (Story, J.,
dissenting))); Harlan R. Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the
Frustration of Human Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 306 (1963) (rejecting "two offense"
theory of exception); Evan Tsen Lee, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy:
In the Wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 22 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 31 (1987) (suggesting that exception is inconsistent with Supreme Court's federalism
jurisprudence); Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double
Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383 (1986) (criticizing the Supreme Court's
continued adherence to exception in contemporary cases); Lawrence Newman, Double
Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions: A Suggested Solution, 34 S. CAL.
L. REV. 252 (1961) (rejecting exception); George C. Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and
Double Jeopardy: A Critique of Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 700 (1963) (arguing that successive prosecutions for violations of statutes
representing substantially the same interests should be prohibited); Michael A. Dawson,
Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE
L.J. 281, 282 (1992) (arguing that exception is "unconstitutional because it violates the
principle of popular sovereignty underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause"); James E. King,
Note, The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State Prosecutions: A Fifth
Amendment Solution, 31 STAN. L. REV. 477, 496-504 (1979) (suggesting modification of
dual sovereignty rule to prohibit states from prosecuting for "same offense" as federal
government, and to allow federal successive prosecution only if "compelling interest"
shown); Note, Double Jeopardy and Federal Prosecution After State Jury Acquittal, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1073 (1982) (rejecting federal-state successive prosecutions following
acquittal); Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise
in Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538 (1967) (suggesting that exception should be
overruled).
10. For an insightful analysis of the values of popular sovereignty inherent in the
double jeopardy guarantee, see Dawson, supra note 9.
11. The Court has also approved successive prosecutions by two states under the dual
sovereignty doctrine, Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 91-94 (1985), and by the federal
government and a Navajo tribe, United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978).
12. In a more general discussion of the topic, Professor Braun recently has suggested
that the dual sovereignty doctrine should be suspended when officers on task forces have
acted more like representatives of one government than two. See Braun, supra note 9, at
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theoretical underpinnings of the dual sovereignty doctrine to the
actual federal-state relationship in drug law enforcement.
The nature and degree of federal-state cooperation in law
enforcement has changed, in large part due to the "war on drugs"
begun in the 1980s. The Article does not take issue with multijuris-
dictional law enforcement efforts, as integrated operations offer many
obvious advantages. It focuses instead on the multijurisdictional
nature of contemporary law enforcement to reveal the doctrinal
weakness of the dual sovereignty theory in cases arising from
multijurisdictional enforcement efforts.
While the theory of "dual sovereignty" as derived from
federalism principles has survived unchanged from the early twentieth
century, in law enforcement the reality of a nation of separate
sovereignties has steadily eroded. Indeed, the creation of a massive,
federally-operated criminal justice system turns the theory of our
federalist system on its head. Traditionally, the states have assumed
the primary role in the administration of criminal justice.13 The
Supreme Court has stated in the past that for the federal government
to take the lead in law enforcement "would bring about a marked
change in the distribution of powers to administer criminal justice, for
the States under our federal system have the principal responsibility
for defining and prosecuting crimes."' 4  Yet, this appears to be
precisely what has happened. 5
Part I of this Article examines the development of federal drug
crimes that mirror those already found in the penal codes of most
states. This Part also demonstrates that the Supreme Court will not
interfere with Congress's drive to further federalize criminal law, and
the Part will explore federalism issues raised by the proliferation of
federal criminal statutes that reach conduct traditionally governed
only by state criminal laws.
72.
13. Only one out of every 20 crimes in America today is prosecuted by the federal
government. H. Scott Wallace, Compulsive Disorder: Stop Me Before I Federalize Again,
THE PROSECUTOR, May/June 1994, at 21 (citing OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMBATTING VIOLENT CRIME 4 (July 1992)). The federal government has the
jurisdiction to prosecute most crimes, but currently lacks the resources to handle the
enormous volume such prosecutions would create. Id. at 24-25.
14. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187,195 (1959); see also Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91,109 (1945) (noting that federal system places administration of criminal justice
with states except as Congress may exercise its delegated powers to create federal
offenses); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1943) (same).
15. See infra notes 93-154 and accompanying text.
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Part II illustrates the multifaceted expansion of federal
government involvement in law enforcement, an expansion facilitated
by the so-called "war on drugs." This Part demonstrates that the
thorough integration of federal, state, and local law enforcement
authorities, particularly in drug cases, renders the concept of
independent sovereigns in drug law enforcement nothing more than
a myth.
In Part III, the Article addresses the double jeopardy
jurisprudence under which successive and dual federal-state
prosecutions are permitted. This Part explores the easy manipulation
of the "same offense" requirement of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
It also takes a critical view of the "dual sovereignty" doctrine,
especially as applied to multijurisdictional drug task force cases.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARALLEL FEDERAL AND STATE
CRIMINAL CODES
Virtually any crime involving illicit drugs can be investigated and
prosecuted as a federal crime, no matter how insignificant the amount
seized or whether any clear federal interest can be discerned. The
expansion of the federal government's concurrent jurisdiction in this
area of criminal law coincides with the general expansion of federal
criminal law in other areas. 6 The anti-drug activity stands out from
the rest, however, because the federal government has made it a top
priority to enforce these violations, whether the defendant be a
"kingpin" or a low-level street pusher.'
7
16. The expansion of federal criminal laws dates back to the 1950s and has not since
abated. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA S. BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 45 (1993). Congress has responded to public frustration with violent crime
by enacting an array of new federal statutes prohibiting conduct traditionally prosecuted
by the states. For example, in 1992 Congress enacted a statute prohibiting "carjacking,"
which refers to the theft of a vehicle from its owner at gunpoint. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp.
V 1993) (amended by 108 Stat. 1796, 1970 (1994)). A 1990 statute makes it a federal
offense to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school. Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1993). In 1984, Congress enacted a law that requires
a mandatory five-year sentence enhancement for using a firearm "in relation to any crime
of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988). Another statute, the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, imposes a five-day waiting period on the sale of any handgun in order to
give the local law enforcement agency time to conduct a background check on the
prospective owner. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
922(s) (Supp. V 1993)).
17. The federal government has placed a high priority on the enforcement of anti-drug
laws since 1980. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that between 1980 and 1990, the
number of drug offenders convicted in federal courts more than tripled, while the number
of non-drug convictions rose by only 32%. DOUGLAS C. McDoNALD ET AL., DEP'T OF
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The following section discusses the expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction into areas previously covered only by state law. As a
result of that expansion, every time a drug transaction occurs, two
offenses-one state and one federal-are committed. The subsequent
section will examine the reasons that the Supreme Court will not
impede Congress as it continues on this course.
A. Expanding the Reach of Federal Drug Laws to Activities
Traditionally Governed by State Law
Early in United States history, most acts considered crimes were
subject only to state criminal law.8 Federal criminal laws were
limited to areas in which the Constitution gave Congress specifically
enumerated powers. 9 As a general rule, federal legislation that
regulates conduct must be justified as an exercise of one of Congress's
enumerated powers. So long as Congress acts pursuant to an
enumerated power, it may enact whatever laws are necessary and
proper to achieve its purpose.20 To the extent that federal law
conflicts with state law, the federal law preempts state law by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. 21 The Tenth Amendment
JUSTICE, FEDERAL SENTENCING IN TRANSrrION, 1986-90, at 4 (1992). Of the 37,725
offenders sentenced to prison by federal courts in 1992, 15,544 were convicted of drug
trafficking. 1992 SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. app. B.
18. The 1872 mail fraud statute was the first significant instance of federal legislation
in an area traditionally within the states' jurisdiction. See Braun, supra note 9, at 4;
Wallace, supra note 13, at 22. It was not until early in the twentieth century that the
Supreme Court even had occasion to review the constitutionality of an 1895 federal
criminal law designed to suppress lotteries and enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause
power and the power to regulate the mails. See Robert E. Cushman, The National Police
Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REv. 289,383-88 (1919)
(discussing The Lottery Case, Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)).
19. See Braun, supra note 9, at 4 n.13.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Necessary and Proper Clause reads in pertinent part:
"The Congress shall have Power... [tio make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." Id.; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited.., are
constitutional.").
21. The Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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reserves any residual powers to the states.2
Over time, Congress began to criminalize much ordinary criminal
activity under the guise of regulating interstate commerce pursuant to
its Article I, Section 8 plenary power.3 With the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970, however, Congress established virtually
unlimited federal jurisdiction for all drug offenses as a way to protect
public morals-without even the pretense of regulating interstate
commerce. The statute covers many types of drug-related crimes on
the basis of congressional findings that drugs have a "substantial and
detrimental effect upon the health and general welfare of the
American people."'24
With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,z Congress further
increased the scope of activity covered by federal criminal law and
significantly enhanced the penalties involved. One provision makes
it a federal crime to possess even small amounts of controlled
substances.26 Similarly, the federal drug law now gives enhanced
protection to young people and pregnant women. 7 Although one
can discern the policy reasons for granting these groups special
protection, there is no obvious reason that federal law-as opposed
to state law-should provide the protection.
The federal statute imposes enhanced sentences in drug
distribution cases when the buyer is under twenty-one years of age,
28
or where drug activity takes place within 1,000 feet of any
22. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
As Professor Hart once stated: "For the most part.... [the Constitution] does no
more than sketch a delegation of federal powers, leaving to Congress, and in a measure
to the federal courts, a broad discretion in deciding whether power should be exercised,
and indeed a considerable freedom even in determining whether such power exists."
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 489,
526 (1954).
23. The Commerce Clause provides: "The Congress shall have the Power... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
24. 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (1988).
25. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified in scattered titles of the
United States Code).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988); see also Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge:
The Supreme Court's Approach to the War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 219, 257 (1992)
(discussing drug law penalties).
27. The far-reaching law doubles and triples the penalties for first- and second-time
drug offenders respectively, if those crimes involve youths or pregnant women. See 21
U.S.C. §§ 859-861 (Supp. V 1993).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 859 (Supp. V 1993).
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school-public or private, grade school through university level-or
within 100 feet of any playground, public or private youth center,
public swimming pool, or video arcade facility.29 The employment
of youths under 18 years of age in drug operations" is covered by
the enhanced-sentence provision, as is the distribution of controlled
substances to pregnant women.3' Each of these provisions reaches
conduct traditionally regulated by state laws. 2
Federalization also provides harsher penalties than those
available at the state level.3 The 1988 law prescribes stiff man-
datory minimum sentences and increases the maximum penalties for
drug offenses. 4 Under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute,
29. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (Supp. V 1993).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)-(d) (Supp. V 1993).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 861(f) (Supp. V 1993).
32. Most states employ traditional indeterminate sentencing which gives courts broad
discretion in deciding which factors to consider at sentencing and how much weight to
accord them. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (noting that
indeterminate sentencing requires courts to look at "the fullest information possible
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics"). Under such a system, offenses that
place vulnerable persons such as minors or pregnant women at risk would likely be
punished more severely.
State legislatures also have sought to provide increased penalties for some types of
drug offenses affecting minors. For example, the distribution of cocaine in the proximity
of a school subjects an offender to enhanced punishment in many states. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11353.1(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994) (imposing a two-year
mandatory minimum sentence); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.44 (McKinney 1989) (imposing
a separate offense with punishment range of 6-25 years); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 481.134(b) (West Supp. 1994) (doubling minimum prison sentence and maximum
fine).
33. While state statutes may authorize long sentences for drug offenses, in most
jurisdictions indeterminate sentencing laws give trial court judges wide discretion in
sentencing convicted persons. In practice, state courts usually mete out sentences that are
shorter than the mandatory minimum terms or guideline ranges required by federal law.
See, e.g., United States v. Vilchez, 967 F.2d 1351, 1352-54 (9th Cir. 1992) (two persons
arrested for same offense by federal-state drug task force; person tried in federal court
received five year mandatory minimum sentence, while person tried in state court received
two year prison sentence); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 901, 929-38 (1991) (discussing
the federal "severity revolution," particularly in drug offenses).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988) (sentencing individual to ten years to life for
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance; if death or serious injury results
from the use of drugs, 20 years to life with a fine of up to $4 million); see also Krasnow,
supra note 26, at 257 (describing penalties assessible under the 1988 law). Previously, the
penalty for a first offense consisted of a term of imprisonment not to exceed 15 years and
a fine of not more than $25,000, or both. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1981).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the new Federal Sentencing
Guidelines has effectively increased federal penalties for drug offenders in some cases for
no valid reason. The Court has construed the weight of the controlled substance, which
is the factor that most influences the sentence, to include the weight of the carrier medium.
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a person convicted of any of the most serious drug felonies will
receive a mandatory life sentence.35 The statute also authorizes the
death penalty for an intentional killing committed in furtherance of
a continuing criminal enterprise.36
Federalization of criminal law also expands the jurisdiction of
federal law enforcement and throws the weight of federal
prosecutorial and judicial resources into the fight against drug
offenders. By making possession of even the smallest amount of a
controlled substance a federal crime, Congress has empowered the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to investigate the entire
gamut of drug offenses as a national police force.37 The laws further
authorize the use of federal prosecutors and courts to enforce these
laws.
The expansion of federal jurisdiction raises two issues for
purposes of this Article: the federalism implications of the displace-
ment of the states as the leading policy makers in criminal law
enforcement, and the expanding practice of successive and dual
prosecutions for a single criminal transaction.
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991). Under this scheme, penalties can
become absurdly out of proportion to the severity of the offense, as the decision is based
on arbitrary factors such as the difference in weight of blotter paper versus sugar cubes.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)
(1991) (defining "Drug Quantity Table" to determine level of offense severity); see also
Alschuler, supra note 33, at 918-24 (arguing that the sentencing guidelines cause arbitrary
inequalities). Thus, the federal penalties may not only be greater than the state laws
covering the same activity, but the reason for the more severe penalties may not even
relate to any rational policy.
In addition, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 allows trial courts to impose special
federal penalties on drug offenders. The Act gives federal, as well as state and local
courts, the authority to declare any person convicted of drug trafficking or drug possession
ineligible for a wide array of federal benefits. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 101-
647, § 1002(d)(2) (1988) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 862 (Supp. V 1993)); see also
OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 24 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL STRATEGY] (discussing statutes enacted to deter casual drug use). A list of over
462 deniable benefits from 53 federal agencies was compiled in 1990. Id. The list includes
such things as student financial aid, small business loans, and pilot's licenses. Id.
The Clinton Administration Justice Department, headed by Attorney General Janet
Reno, has signalled a new willingness to reconsider the severity of drug sentences, at least
with regard to minor offenders. Stephen Labaton, Reno Moving to Reverse StiffSentencing
Rule for Minor Drug Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at A19.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1988). A "continuing criminal enterprise" is defined as a
violation of title 21 undertaken in concert with at least five other persons and from which
the organizer obtains substantial income. Id. § 848(c)(2).
36. Id. § 848(e)(1)(A).
37. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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B. Unchecked Expansionism: The Futility of Legal Challenges to the
Federalization of Criminal Law
Congress can do as it pleases, at least in enacting federal criminal
laws. Although the Constitution grants Congress a limited set of
enumerated powers38-e.g., the powers to levy taxes, control the
mails, and regulate interstate comerce39 -the Supreme Court has
effectively given Congress carte blanche to criminalize conduct.4 In
reviewing federal criminal laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause power, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between truly
commercial regulations and criminal laws.41 The Court also has not
applied a strict test for evaluating criminal laws that Congress
contends "affect" interstate commerce. The Court's approval of
the federalization of criminal law means that we can expect a
continuation of the steady march toward a national law enforcement
establishment, the continued diminution of the states' role in
formulating criminal justice policy, and the continued development of
parallel federal and state criminal codes.
Two legal challenges might be brought to stem the growth of the
federal criminal justice enterprise. First, a federal law can be chal-
lenged as an improper exercise of the Commerce Clause power. This
approach may succeed in the rare case, but fails as a rigorous check
on congressional overreaching.43 Second, a state may challenge the
law on Tenth Amendment federalism grounds. However, the Tenth
Amendment proves inapplicable as an impediment to federal criminal
law expansion.' Thus, unless the political climate surrounding the
38. The most important of these are found, of course, in U.S. CONsT. art. I.
39. For a discussion of the basic constitutional framework underlying Congress's
powers to regulate, see Cushman, supra note 18, at 290-99.
40. See infra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
41. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
43. The Supreme Court will hear a Fifth Circuit case on this issue this term. United
States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
Ultimately, the Court can be expected to reject this claim as foreclosed by its decision in
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Perez approved a federal loan-sharking law
in a case that did not involve any interstate activity. Id. at 156-57; see infra notes 61-70
and accompanying text.
44. Litigants frequently bring both Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause claims
together in these cases. At the same time that the Commerce Clause grants Congress
regulatory power, it also implicitly limits the power of the states to regulate those activities.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 305-06 (2d ed. 1988).
Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment
questions are "mirror images of each other." New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408,
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crime issue changes, we can expect Congress to continue to federalize
crimes that have traditionally been prosecuted by the states. No legal
impediments will block Congress's way.
1. The Ubiquitous Interstate Commerce Power
Early in our country's history, Congress exercised its power to
regulate interstate commerce only when its legislation would in fact
protect the flow of interstate commerce. By the late nineteenth
century, however, the legislature began to rely on its Commerce
Clause power to enact criminal statutes in an effort to protect other
things, including public morals.45
In 1895, Congress responded to national disapproval of lotteries
by prohibiting the movement of lottery tickets by mail or via
interstate commerce.46 Having heard argument on the case no fewer
than three times, the Supreme Court approved this legislation in a
five-to-four decision.47 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
attempted in dicta to limit the scope of the Court's ruling,48 but the
questions presented and the decision rendered could only be read as
a revolutionary imprimatur on the expansion of congressional powers.
The decision was interpreted as permitting Congress's federalization
of criminal law and other regulatory activities under the guise of
regulating interstate commerce.49
Throughout the twentieth century, the Court's rulings have given
Congress increasing latitude to enact federal criminal laws in the
2417 (1992). Each provision presents different questions, however, and deserves separate
treatment.
45. Cushman, supra note 18, at 383-92.
46. Id. at 383.
47. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321,363-64 (1903); see also Cushman, supra note 18,
at 384-88 (discussing arguments and decision in Champion).
48. The Court concluded its opinion as follows: "The whole subject is too important,
and the questions suggested by its consideration are too difficult of solution, to justify any
attempt to lay down a rule for determining in advance the validity of every statute that
may be enacted under the commerce clause." Champion, 188 U.S. at 363.
49. As early as 1919, one author wrote:
The decision in the Lottery Case has been discussed at length because it was in
a sense a pioneer decision, because it has had a profound influence upon the
subsequent development of the national police power, and because, in spite of
Mr. Justice Harlan's warning against making unwarranted deductions from it, it
has been regarded by many as establishing a doctrine regarding the power of
Congress to prohibit various kinds of interstate commerce which is far more
revolutionary than it was the expressed purpose of the court to sanction.
Cushman, supra note 18, at 387.
1170 [Vol. 73
1995] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT 1171
name of interstate commerce regulation." Ultimately, however, the
decisions have embraced such an expansive interpretation of the
power that some regard judicial review as "largely a formality."'"
The drafting of federal criminal laws to meet the interstate
commerce requirement can proceed in one of two ways. First, the
statute may require as a jurisdictional element of the offense that the
prosecution prove an interstate commerce nexus. 52 Second, Congress
may dispense with the jurisdictional element if it finds that a "class of
activities" taken together "affects" interstate commerce. In either
case, the great weight of authority permits a finding of federal
jurisdiction based only on a showing of a "minimal" effect on
interstate commerce.5 3 Indeed, the lengths to which courts are
50. During a period from 1887 to 1937, the Court attempted to cabin Congress's power
by limiting it to a restrictive category of economic activity. TRIBE, supra note 44, § 5-4,
at 305-10. Applying formal distinctions between types of economic activity, the Court
struck down congressional enactments including important New Deal legislation. Id. at
308. The Court abandoned this effort in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937), and, according to Professor Tribe, "acceded to political pressure and to its own
recognition of its doctrine's irrelevance and manipulability." TRIBE, supra note 44, § 5-4,
at 309.
51. TRIBE, supra note 44, § 5-8, at 316.
52. When Congress includes language requiring proof of a certain type of connection
between the defendant's conduct and interstate commerce, federal courts have on some
occasions shown reluctance to construe these requirements broadly or to allow the
government to dispense with them altogether. For example, in United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971), the Supreme Court reviewed a statute making it a federal crime for a
felon to "receive[], possess[], or transportj in commerce or affecting commerce... any
firearm. .. " Id. at 337. The government had interpreted the interstate commerce
requirement to apply only to the transportation of firearms, not to their receipt or
possession. Id. at 338. The Court opted for a narrow reading of the statute and refused
any interpretation allowing the government to dispense with the interstate commerce
requirement for possession of firearms. Id. at 347. The decision rests in part on
federalism concerns:
[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state balance. Congress has traditionally been
reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by
the States. ... [W]e will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to
effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction.
Id. at 349 (footnotes omitted); see also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971)
(finding interstate travel of patrons of gambling establishment insufficient); United States
v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 446 (1953) (stating that federal criminal statute
that fails to require proof of interstate commerce nexus presents serious constitutional
question).
53. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563,575 (1977) (arguing Congress
intended to require only minimal nexus); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 108-09
(6th Cir. 1994) (citing Scarborough and upholding carjacking statute that does not require
car used in crime to be traveling in interstate commerce). In United States v. Evans, 928
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willing to go to find an interstate commerce effect render the
requirement meaningless. Courts' efforts do, however, make for
humorous reading. For example, decisions have determined that
courts, prosecutors' offices, sheriffs' departments, and clerks of court
have an effect on interstate commerce in part because their offices
purchase supplies that have traveled in interstate commerce.5 4 How
the prosecution of a corrupt state official can have anything to do
with the fact that the office buys out-of-state pencils escapes
reasonable comprehension and appears to make a mockery of the
interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement.
Most anti-drug legislation does not require that the prosecution
prove an interstate commerce connection as a jurisdictional element
because Congress has determined that this is a class of activities that,
as a whole, affects interstate commerce. In the 1965 Amendments to
F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit found that Congress could prohibit the
possession of unregistered machine guns without specific proof of an interstate commerce
effect in each case. Id. at 862. Because Congress had determined that firearms killed
people, this finding was sufficient to show an effect on the national economy through the
insurance industry. Id. This "tenuous" nexus was sufficient. Id.; accord United States v.
Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that defendant's flight
was only intrastate because aircraft operated with the intent of being a potential
component of interstate transportation).
54. The Fifth Circuit found "more than ample evidence" of an interstate commerce
nexus, in part because the Florida court purchased office supplies from outside the state.
United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1075 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981). Other evidence
included the fact that the court handled extraditions and that it served out-of-state
litigants. Id.; see also United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 6-7 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding
prosecutor's office affected interstate commerce); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060,
1061 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding sheriff's department affected interstate commerce); United
States v. Joseph, 510 F. Supp. 1001, 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding clerk of court affected
interstate commerce). Another court stated, in a case involving the prosecution of a judge
for corruption, that most courts affect interstate commerce because "those who interpret
and apply the law can indeed work major changes upon the economy." United States v.
Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Penn. 1979).
Other cases assessing the interstate commerce elements of federal criminal statutes
should also elicit hearty laughter. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1038
(10th Cir.) (holding effect on interstate commerce where defendant bought car
manufactured in another state and bought diamond ring in Oklahoma, of which gold came
from Indiana and diamonds came from New York), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 169 (1992);
United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210,1219 (8th Cir.) (stating, without further explanation,
that interstate commerce effect was "inevitable incident of the construction of a shopping
mall"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 399 (1991); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 231 (2nd
Cir.) (citing bombing of building used in interstate commerce as affecting interstate
commerce), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535,546-
47 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding effect on interstate commerce based on interstate phone calls,
purchase of dynamite originating in interstate commerce, and destruction of automobiles
used in activities affecting interstate commerce), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
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the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938,"5 Congress first
dispensed with the usual requirement that the government must show
a connection between the criminal conduct and interstate commerce
in each case. 6 Instead, Congress included in the statute findings and
policy declarations that sought to justify the application of the
amendments to cases involving purely local activity."
The main rationale given, and that which continues to be relied
upon in anti-drug legislation, is that illicit drugs are unlabeled, and
therefore, law enforcement officers have no way of knowing whether
the drugs were manufactured locally or whether they traveled in
interstate commerce. 8 The statute also includes the finding that
locally distributed controlled substances "usually have been
transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distribu-
tion." 9  Presumably, the logic proceeds as follows: (1) most drugs
travel in interstate commerce prior to their local distribution; (2) the
federal government may regulate any substance that has at any time
traveled in interstate commerce; (3) drugs are not labeled to indicate
their source of origin; and therefore, (4) in order to regulate those
drugs that have previously traveled in interstate commerce, it is
necessary for the federal government to regulate all local distribution.
Lower courts have consistently invoked this reasoning to deny
defendants' challenges to the constitutionality of their federal drug
convictions under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.'
In Perez v. United States,6 the Supreme Court ratified this mode
of analysis in another context. Three years after the 1965
55. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988).
56. See, e.g., Deyo v. United States, 396 F.2d 595, 596 (9th Cir. 1968) ("There is no
question but that Congress here has resorted to a wholly new technique for bringing the
regulation of drug traffic within the scope of the commerce clause.").
57. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 2, 79 Stat. 226,
226-27.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 801(5) (1988). The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was
superseded by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988). The findings and declarations in the 1970 statute include this
rationale. 21 U.S.C. § 801(5).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3)(B) (1988).
60. See United States v. Rodriguez, 438 F.2d 1164,1165 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Lamear, 417 F.2d 626, 627 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 967 (1970); United
States v. Cerrito, 413 F.2d 1270, 1271 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970);
United States v. Fields, 410 F.2d 373, 374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 965 (1969);
United States v. Heiman, 406 F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 1969); White v. United States, 399
F.2d 813, 824 (8th Cir. 1968); Deyo v. United States, 396 F.2d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 1968);
White v. United States, 395 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928 (1968).
61. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Congress
enacted Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 to
regulate extortionate credit transactions.62 Like the anti-drug
legislation, Title II did not require that a particular transaction
specifically involve interstate commerce. Instead, Congress's findings
stated that all local loan-sharking activities necessarily affected
interstate commerce and therefore could be regulated by federal
law. 3 In contrast to the drug context, the 1968 legislature did not
claim any difficulty in distinguishing between interstate and intrastate
transactions. Rather, Congress simply stated that loan-sharking
"affects" interstate commerce-a tenuous conclusion at best.'
The decision to uphold the regulation of all loan-sharking activity
marks the Supreme Court's first decision on the constitutionality of
a federal criminal law grounded in the commerce clause since the turn
of the century. Perez is also the Court's last decision on the matter
to date.65 In Perez, the Court applied a test developed in the
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1988).
63. The relevant congressional finding states: "A substantial part of the income of
organized crime is generated by extortionate credit transactions.... Extortionate credit
transactions are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate and foreign commerce....
Even where extortionate credit transactions are purely intrastate in character, they
nonetheless directly affect interstate commerce." Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 90-321, § 201(a)(1), (3), 82 Stat. 146, 159 (1968).
64. See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization Of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 213, 252-53 (1984) ("Congress's conclusion that loan-sharking affects interstate
commerce is highly questionable in many cases."); Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause
Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 271,276 (1973) (noting
that "congressional findings baldly stated there was [an interstate commerce] connection"
to loan-sharking).
65. The last such case decided before Perez was Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321
(1902); see supra notes 47-49. At the moment, the Supreme Court's docket includes a
Fifth Circuit case in which the lower court invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1993), criminalizing the
possession of a weapon within 1000 feet of any school. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d
1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). A Ninth Circuit decision
upholding the same statute created a conflict within the circuit courts. See United States
v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 292-95 (9th Cir. 1993).
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Lopez will likely be reversed because it flies in the face
of most Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The circuit court clearly disapproved of the
reach of the statute:
The Gun Free School Zones Act extends to criminalize any person's carrying of
any unloaded shotgun, in an unlocked pickup truck gun rack, while driving on a
country road that at one turn happens to come within 950 feet of the boundary
of the grounds of a one-room church kindergarten located on the other side of
a river, even during the summer when the kindergarten is not in session.
Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366. The court was bothered with the seemingly unlimited reach of
congressional power:
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context of traditional economic regulations 66 to the loan-sharking
law, but failed to note any distinction between a statute that regulates
commercial activity and a criminal law. The test permits Congress to
regulate a "class of activities" without proof that the particular
intrastate activity in question has any effect on interstate com-
merce.
67
In determining the validity of the legislation, the Court must
determine only whether there exists a rational basis for Congress's
finding that the class of activities affects interstate commerce.68 The
Court does not require a significant impact on interstate commerce;
it upheld the legislation in Perez even though the effects on interstate
commerce were unclear.69 The Perez case has put to rest any doubt
If Congress can thus bar firearms possession because of such a nexus to the
grounds of any public or private school, and can do so without supportive
findings or legislative history, on the theory that education affects commerce,
then it could also similarly ban lead pencils, "sneakers," Game Boys, or slide
rules.
Id. at 1367.
The Fifth Circuit's holding is limited. The decision specifically takes issue with
Congress's failure to state any findings or provide any legislative history supporting the
nexus between carrying a firearm near a school and interstate commerce. Id. at 1367-68.
The court found that this omission represented "a sharp break with the long-standing
pattern of federal firearms legislation" that rendered the statute unconstitutional. Id. at
1366.
On several occasions, the Court has assessed federal criminal statutes to determine
the proper interpretation of their interstate commerce provisions. See, e.g., United States
v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396,410 (1973) (Hobbs Act); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,337-
38 (1971) (possession of a firearm by a felon); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 743, 812
(1971) (Travel Act); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 450 (1953)
(plurality opinion) (gambling device prohibition).
66. The Court relied primarily on the test developed in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941). In Darby, Congress set the wages and hours for workers who
produced goods "for interstate commerce." Id. at 117. The Court invoked the Darby test
in the civil rights cases of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). In those cases, regulations
affecting private hotels, motels, inns, and restaurants were upheld on the grounds that
these establishments serve interstate travelers or that a substantial portion of the food
served traveled in interstate commerce. McClung, 379 U.S. at 300; Heart of Atlanta Motel,
379 U.S. at 258. The wisdom of permitting Congress to regulate restaurants because the
food served has traveled in interstate commerce can be criticized for the same reasons this
Article applies in the criminal context. However, facilitating the interstate travel of
citizens by prohibiting discrimination on the part of hotels and restaurants that offer their
services to the public is precisely the type of activity appropriate for Commerce Clause
regulation. See Stern, supra note 64, at 272-74; Bradley, supra note 64, at 253.
67. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971).
68. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 255.
69. The decision states that the congressional findings incorporated into the statute are
"quite adequate." Perez, 402 U.S. at 155. The opinion then cites three reports that show
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that Congress can criminalize virtually any type of activity, whether
local or interstate in character, because the purported limitations on
its power are meaningless.1 0
2. The State Sovereignty Claim
A second avenue by which to challenge the expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction-the Tenth Amendment's protection of state
sovereignty 7-also offers little hope for success in preventing
improper successive prosecutions. The Supreme Court has almost
consistently rejected claims that federal legislation improperly
impinges on states' sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment.72 A few cases striking down federal laws stand out as "oddi-
that loan-sharking schemes are big business, that they are controlled by organized crime
syndicates, and that the activities of these syndicates "affect interstate and foreign
commerce." Id. at 155-56. This reasoning is flawed: that organized crime syndicates are
involved both in loan-sharking rackets and in activities that affect interstate commerce
does not show that the loan-sharking is one of the activities that affects interstate
commerce.
The last sentence of the decision hints at an alternative theory-most organized crime
syndicates are "national operations." Id. at 157. However, the summaries of the three
reports do not indicate that criminal organizations were found to extend beyond state
borders in most cases, and this theory was not clearly articulated.
70. Until recent challenges, the last cases criticizing the broad use of the Commerce
Clause were those brought in the wake of Perez in the 1970s. See United States v.
Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to
criminalization of marijuana cultivation), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 442 (1991); United States
v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481, 498 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
927 (1979); United States v. Davis, 561 F.2d 1014,1018-20 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 929 (1977); United States v. Montes-Zarate, 552 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (9th Cir.
1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978); United States v. Atkinson, 513 F.2d 38,39-
40 (4th Cir. 1975) (same); United States v. Esposito, 492 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1973) (same),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353,356 (10th Cir. 1973)
(same); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268,272-73 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); United States
v. Leisner, 469 F.2d 336,336-37 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
942 (1973); United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1972)
(same), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 985 (1973); United States v. Scales, 464 F.2d 371, 373-76 (6th
Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. Lane, 461 F.2d 343,344 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (same),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 952 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d 949, 950-53 (5th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972); see also supra note 65 (discussing recent cases
challenging federal legislation on Commerce Clause grounds).
71. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
72. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 907 (1994) ("[IThe federal courts, despite occasional
oddities like Gregory, New York v. United States, or National League of Cities v. Usery,
have not favored federalism at any time during their existence. To the contrary, they have
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ties" in the otherwise uniform line of decisions.73 The cases evidence
some tension over the correct interpretation of "Our Federalism," the
doctrine recognizing that states have a sphere of sovereignty protected
by the Tenth Amendment.74  Although some would dismiss
federalism concerns as a kind of national "neurosis,"'75 many others
support the constitutional Framers' vision of separate inviolable
spheres of sovereignty maintained between the national and state
governments.76
The Court made one of its broadest and, ultimately, most short-
lived statements on federalist principles in National League of Cities
v. Usery.' In that case, the Court approved a limitation on
Congress's power to regulate state activity-a limitation rooted in
federalist principles and grounded in the Tenth Amendment. The
decision in National League of Cities attempted to curb Congress's
ability to "supplant[ the considered policy choices of the States'
elected officials"'78 in areas of "traditional governmental functions,
79
and further attempted to prevent Congress from "impair[ing] the
been consistent opponents of federalist positions, as recent history demonstrates.").
73. Id. at 907-08.
74. The Court articulated its "Our Federalism" theory in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971). Essentially, the Court stated that there is a federal interest in having states
maintain their separate spheres. Id. at 44.
75. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 72, at 908.
76. The overarching consideration lies in the choice between national uniformity and
decentralization. Hart, supra note 22, at 528. In reality, federal and state laws and policies
often involve "highly complex interrelationships." Id. at 527. However, "beneath the
technicalities lie far-reaching considerations of policy in the distribution of governmental
'say.' " Id. at 527.
A number of articles have been written on federalism issues. See, e.g., Ann Althouse,
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE
L.J. 979 (1993); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987); Bradley, supra note 64; Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the
Congressional Commerce Power, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 901 (1987); Richard A. Epstein, Exit
Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1992); D. Bruce La Pierre,
PoliticalAccountability in the National Political Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review
of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 577 (1985); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger,
The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267 (1993); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988); Rubin & Feeley,
supra note 72; Stern, supra note 64; Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GEO.
L. REv. 917 (1985); Alan N. Greenspan, Note, The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal
Police Power: A Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1019 (1988).
77. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
78. Id. at 848.
79. Id. at 852.
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States' 'ability to function effectively in a federal system.' ""
Recognizing the difficulty of delineating the boundaries of a state's
inviolable sphere, the Court nonetheless identified the "traditional
governmental functions" test as a means of protecting the states' core
functions from officious federal interference. The Court included a
short list of examples of activities "typical of those performed by state
and local governments in discharging their dual functions of ad-
ministering the public law and furnishing public services."81 Among
the activities listed was "police protection."'
Only nine years later, the Court overruled National League of
Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.8
3
The Court held that the decision of whether a function belonged in
the state or federal sphere should be made through the political
process, and not by the judiciary.'4 Garcia rested on a questionable
assumption: that the National League of Cities decision underes-
timated the ability of the states to protect their sovereignty through
the national political process.' Oddly, the Court also suggested that
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 851.
82. Id.
83. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
84. Id. at 539, 546, 550.
85. The Court stated that the decision "underestimated . . . the solicitude of the
national political process for the continued vitality of the States." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
The Court looked to the amount of money allocated to states by the federal government
and to the states' ability to exempt themselves from some federal regulations. Id. at 552-
53. This position lacks force in the context of the drug war. A federalist system that
leaves to the political process the role of maintaining the proper balance between federal
and state control functions properly only if the two spheres of governance consider
themselves, in a sense, in competition. Like the advocacy system in which we vest issues
of justice, the federalist system produces the "right" outcome from a struggle between two
adversaries of relatively equal strength. When one party grows to such an extent that it
can dominate the other, or where one party willingly abdicates its role in exchange for
other consideration, the political check fails.
In the past, serious reflection ruled out the possibility that we would choose complete
national uniformity over some combination of uniformity and decentralization. Professor
Hart said of complete national uniformity: "So Procrustean a solution to the problems of
federalism is unlikely to find wide favor." Hart, supra note 22, at 540. He gave two main
reasons for this view: (1) A uniform national system would be administratively unwieldy;
(2) common sense and the instinct for freedom of the American people would lead them
to not put "all their eggs of hope ... in one governmental basket." Id.
The situation in criminal justice has changed since Professor Hart was writing in the
1950s. His belief in the lasting nature of the federalist system rested on the ability of the
political process to police the relationship, which no longer holds true. The administrative
obstacles in constructing a national model of government have been overcome by
recruiting state and local agencies to provide the knowledge of local landscapes and
additional manpower. The other backstop to nationalization-the belief that the American
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the "traditional governmental functions" test undermines the states'
role as "laboratories'"-presumably because it locks states into
"traditional" roles and does not allow them to adapt to the changing
needs of communities.'
Had National League of Cities not been overruled in Garcia, its
rationale might have supported an argument against the federal
government's development of parallel criminal laws. Since the Court
specifically singled out "police protection" as a traditional governmen-
tal function of the states, federal criminal law initiatives that have the
effect of displacing state laws would fail the National League of Cities
test. Viewed collectively, federal drug laws may be said to "sig-
nificantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure"' their
own policies.'
Even if National League of Cities were still good law, however,
several obstacles would still prevent a state from successfully challeng-
ing the constitutionality of federal drug policies. First, none of the
anti-drug policies of the federal government directly regulate the
"States as States," one of the threshold requirements of the National
League of Cities doctrine.89 That is, in the anti-drug context, federal
policies do not displace state policies by preemption. Instead, federal
policies create an enterprise that is larger, more powerful and that
people would not permit the diminution of state power-also has given way under the
weight of enormous anxiety over drugs and violent crime. See Wendy Kaminer, Federal
Offense, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1994, at 102 (criticizing public policy in criminal
justice as pandering to public fear of violent crime and disregarding expert assessments).
Moreover, state and local agencies willingly cooperate with the federal effort. See infra
notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
86. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
87. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
88. A state cannot, for example, experiment with drug legalization, since federal law
makes the citizens of the state subject to its anti-drug laws. Of course, state legislators are
free to decriminalize cocaine or any other substance for that matter. However, as a
practical matter, the federal drug laws that reach simple possession of small quantities of
controlled substances-and the massive federal apparatus for enforcing these laws-render
state policy meaningless.
Moreover, what traditionally were state choices in fixing the proper punishment for
various crimes are no longer the states' alone. The decision whether to permit capital
punishment for certain types of traditionally state offenses provides a poignant example
of this shift in decision-making power. The federal government now regularly seeks the
death penalty in drug cases, even in states that prohibit the death penalty under their state
constitutions. See Wallace, supra note 13, at 23. In the past, the possibility of a death
sentence in a federal case existed for such crimes as treason, but the paucity of offenses
subject to the penalty as well as the low incidence of these offenses made a federal death
penalty more theoretical than real.
89. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
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imposes its own criminal laws on the citizens of the states. States may
change their criminal laws or sentences, but citizens of the state must
still abide by federal laws, including their stiff penalties.
Second, the National League of Cities decision does not prevent
the federal government from creating law enforcement operations that
invite state and local agencies to participate. Even if the courts
limited the reach of federal criminal laws, such a limitation would not
inhibit the authority of Congress to offer financial incentives to states
and localities for their cooperation. Were the states to object to the
federal policy agenda, they could "just say no."'9  Legislation
creating multijurisdictional task forces91 does not require state and
local agencies to cooperate. Only if it did would such an endeavor
come within the ambit of the National League of Cities ruling.
In sum, because the federal government need not preempt or
displace state laws in passing comparable federal criminal laws, states
have no grounds on which to challenge the growing scope of the
federal law enforcement establishment.' Even under the now
defunct Tenth Amendment test of National League of Cities, such a
challenge would fail.
III. THE CREATION OF A CONSOLIDATED, MULTIJURISDICrIONAL
AND FEDERALLY-DIRECrED LAW ENFORCEMENT ESTABLISHMENT
Hand-in-hand with Congress's federalization of anti-drug laws is
its effort to promote a national enforcement effort. In one sense, the
so-called "war on drugs" marks the continuation of an old trend in
federal criminal justice expansionism. For most of the century, the
federal government's law enforcement efforts, which focused largely
on organized crime, grew steadily.93 However, the scale and the
90. Drug users were advised to "just say no" in the federal government's famous 1980s
anti-drug media campaign.
91. See infra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
92. Nonetheless, National League of Cities and Garcia provide a framework for
consideration of a question raised by the anti-drug effort: To what extent may states and
the federal government jointly decide to do away with the states' separate sphere of
control over the policing of communities? Put another way, if the various governments
(presumably representing popular sentiment) agree to merge into one national
government, can it be said that the Constitution is somehow violated? As this Article does
not attempt to answer all the Tenth Amendment issues presented in this context, I leave
these questions for another day.
93. Ever since prohibition and the criminalization of opium spurred the proliferation
of organized crime groups, Congress has found ample support for its expansionist activities.
See Bradley, supra note 64, at 225-26. In virtually every instance, Congress and the Justice
Department have promoted the concept of a "war" effort against an evil too vast for the
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multi-dimensional nature of the expansion of the war on drugs is
unprecedented. By the mid-1980s, Congress shifted from targeting
organized crime syndicates per se to attacking every type of drug-
related activity.94
Beginning in the 1980s, the federal government declared its
resolve to engage substantial resources to fight a drug war.' To
facilitate this task, Congress worked steadfastly to provide law
enforcement with a greater arsenal. The working philosophy behind
the "war" effort called for a massive law enforcement program96 and
harsh treatment for drug offenders.' Congress has allocated
substantial drug control budgets for seventeen federal departments
and sizeable drug control grants to the states.98 Overall, federal
spending on drug control efforts has multiplied many times over the
last twelve years. From 1981 to 1994, the federal budget for drug
individual states to handle. Id. at 232, 235.
94. Today, criminal justice authorities see organized crime as practically synonymous
with narcotics trafficking. For example, the primary law enforcement unit that handles
drug traffickers is called the "Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force"
(OCDETF), thereby highlighting the important connection between organized crime and
drug trade. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 40-42 (1994) (describing OCDETF).
95. The efforts begun in the 1980s, however, were not unprecedented. See Bradley,
supra note 64, at 264 (demonstrating that the three branches of federal government united
to pursue an organized crime agenda in the past).
96. In fiscal year 1993, 68% of all federal drug control money was earmarked for
"supply side" activities, or law enforcement, as opposed to drug treatment or education.
See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 140 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL STRATEGY]; see also Joseph B. Treaster, Some Think the 'War on Drugs' Is
Being Waged on Wrong Front, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at Al (asserting that the Bush
Administration policy "has consistently subordinated health and education to law
enforcement"). The Clinton Administration has said that it gives drug treatment a higher
priority than did the Bush Administration. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, BUDGET
SUMMARY 3-4 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY]. The numbers, however, do
not confirm this statement. Compare 1991 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra
note 34, at 141 (chart depicting distribution of federal resources through fiscal year 1993)
with 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra, at 2 (same chart through fiscal year 1995). But see
Joseph B. Treaster, Clinton Altering Nation's Tactics in Drug Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1993, at Al (reporting that President Clinton planned to focus national drug strategy on
treatment for hard-core drug users and social programs rather than on interdiction of
drugs).
97. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
98. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 184-87; OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY WHITE PAPER, FEDERAL DRUG GRANTS To STATES apps. C & D
(1990).
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control grew 750 percent from 1.7 billion to 12.1 billion dollars.9
For fiscal year 1995, the Clinton Administration has requested 13.2
billion dollars."°
Congress has capitalized on its ability to funnel federal money in
exchange for compliance with federal law enforcement policy in order
to direct criminal justice policy. The following subsections catalogue
the federal laws and initiatives that comprise the national drug control
strategy to demonstrate the extent to which federal, state, and local
law enforcement have become increasingly consolidated and uniform.
A. Expanding Federal Resources by Enticing States to Join Forces:
The Emergence of a Multijurisdictional Model of Law
Enforcement
Perhaps as significant as increased spending by the federal
government is the fact that the enforcement effort has engaged the
cooperation of law enforcement at all levels of government. Rather
than simply working together on joint programs, however, the federal
strategy brings state and local agents into the federal fold.
Although federal law enforcement agencies have worked
cooperatively with state and local police since the mid-1960s, these
relationships became formal and ongoing with the onset of the drug
war.1 The DEA has developed programs for multijurisdictional
drug law enforcement to harness the support of state and local police
agencies.2 These programs provide the DEA with access to ad-
ditional manpower, and state and local police provide street-level
intelligence about drug activity in their communities. The two most
significant cooperative programs are the DEA State and Local Task
Forces (DEA-SL Task Forces) and the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs). °3
99. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 183; see also Sandra Guerra, Domestic
Drug Interdiction Operations: Finding the Balance, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109,
1112 (1992) (stating that between 1981 and 1992 federal spending on drug control
increased 700%).
100. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supranote 96, at 1.
101. JAN CHAIKEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG LAW
ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: REDUCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 45-47 (1990).
102. See Sandra Guerra, Reconciling Federal Asset Forfeitures and Drug Offense
Sentencing, 78 MINN. L. REv. 805, 824-27 (1994).
103. A third program, created in 1988, designates certain areas as "High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas" (HIDTAs). The HIDTA areas receive additional federal funds to
support federal, state, and local drug enforcement initiatives. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY,
supra note 96, at 125-27. The HIDTA areas include the cities of New York, Miami,
Houston, and Los Angeles, and the southwest border. In 1993, HIDTA areas received $86
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The DEA-SL Task Forces were created in -197 3 ."°4 The
program did not fully develop, however, until asset forfeiture benefits
became available to state and local agencies in the 1980s."°5 In
1994, the DEA-SL Task Forces numbered eighty-one, with an
additional twenty-two provisional state and local task forces.' 6 The
Clinton administration has requested a budget of $73.2 million for the
DEA-SL Task Forces in fiscal year 1995."7
The OCDETF program took effect in 1982 as part of a drug
control initiative announced by President Reagan.' °8 The program
established a second set of multijurisdictional task forces coordinated
by the United States Attorneys' offices in thirteen "core" cities.109
The task forces target high-level drug traffickers and large-scale
money laundering organizations."' The program purports to focus
on financial investigations in order to reinforce drug charges, lead to
the forfeiture of drug dealers' assets and provide jurors with a better
understanding of the size of the drug organization."'
While these multijurisdictional operations include state and local
agents, federal officials clearly make the final decisions on priorities
and policies, with non-federal agents providing input and manpower.
The Executive Review Board of the program, for example, is
comprised of the heads of the nine federal agencies that participate
in OCDETF, as well as senior officials of the Departments of Justice
and Treasury."' State and local officials do not sit on the Executive
million in funding of which $36.7 million was distributed to state and local agencies. Id.
at 43.
104. CHAIKEN ET AL., supra note 101, at 44.
105. Id. at 44-45.
106. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 90.
107. Id. at 88.
108. OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE PROGRAM, 1989-90 2 (1991).
109. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 109. The 13 Task Force regions
include (with the headquarters city for each listed in parentheses): New England (Boston);
New York/New Jersey (New York City); Mid-Atlantic (Baltimore); Southeast (Atlanta);
Gulf Coast (Houston); South Central (St. Louis); North Central (Chicago); Great Lakes
(Detroit); Mountain (Denver); Los Angeles/Nevada (Los Angeles); Northwest (San
Francisco); Southwest Border (San Diego); and Florida/Caribbean (Miami). Id.
110. Id.
111. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., supra note 108, at 3.
112. The nine federal agencies are: the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the
Drug Enforcement Administration; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Internal
Revenue Service; the U.S. Attorneys' offices; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. Customs
Service; the U.S. Marshal's Service; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id.
at 2.
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Review Board. The task forces are federal creations, funded and
operated by the federal government.
A number of other federal initiatives also advance the federal
agenda of promoting aggressive, multijurisdictional law enforcement
for even low-level drug crimes. The United States Attorneys' offices
nationwide direct and control each of the initiatives. Some of them
are prosecutorial initiatives that involve the invocation of federal
criminal laws against offenders of a particular type. One such
initiative, created in April of 1991 and called "Project Triggerlock,"
has brought together federal, state, and local law enforcement to form
task forces coordinated in each district by the United States Attorney.
Under this project, federal officials identify and prosecute violent
armed criminals, including those who use firearms while trafficking in
drugs.13 The persons arrested by members of the task forces are
prosecuted in federal court for possession of a weapon by a felon or
possession of a weapon for an offense involving gang members. 4
Federal prosecutors have been directed to request the maximum
penalties allowed in these cases."
5
What is not apparent is why the federal government considers it
its business to prosecute persons who possess weapons and who may
be felons or gang members. After all, gun possession cases are not
violent crimes per se, only dangerous situations. In this sense, they
are less serious than murder, armed robbery, or any other crime of
violence. States have long prosecuted unlawful gun possession cases,
and there is no evidence that they have been ineffective.
Other federal initiatives involve the creation of programs of the
sort normally developed at the state or local level. The programs are
initially funded and organized by the federal government, with the
intent of pressuring states to follow suit and maintain the programs
themselves. In each instance, the federal government has used its
expansive powers to control the direction of criminal justice policy.
For example, in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots of 1992, much
attention focused on a federal initiative known as the "Weed and
Seed" program."6  The program is modeled after similar local
efforts that aim to sweep through a neighborhood arresting drug
113. Letter from Attorney General William P. Barr to Federal Prosecutors (Jan. 31,
1992), reprinted in Fed. Sentencing Rep. 351 (May/June 1992).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Experts Are Critical of Bush Anti-Drug Program,
N.Y. TEs, July 20, 1992, at A12 (stating that Los Angeles was added to the "Weed and
Seed" Program after riots).
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dealers and then provide a broad range of social services to revitalize
the area."7 Although the federal government has shown an interest
in funding these programs in localities, the second phase of the pro-
gram-the provision of social services-may lack support at the
federal level. The federal initiative, including the social services
component, is under the direction of a central federal office and the
United States Attorneys." 8 Because no proposals for social services
have been forthcoming, critics complain that the law enforcement side
of the program is over-emphasized."'
B. Encouraging States to Adopt Specific Laws and Policies Using
Financial Carrots and Sticks
Because states and localities have not always shown an eagerness
to submit to the control of federal agencies, the federal government
has found it necessary to entice their cooperation. 2 The drug task
forces encourage participation in two ways. First, they offer state and
117. See Guerra, supra, note 99, at 1155-60 (discussing community-oriented operations
to rid neighborhoods of drug dealers and invest in long-term improvements in neighbor-
hoods' quality of life).
118. According to the National Drug Control Strategy for 1994:
The Executive Office for Weed and Seed develops policy for Operation Weed
and Seed and serves as the primary point of contact for information and decision
making for the program nationally. The Office also supports the U.S. Attorneys,
who are responsible for the locally-driven development and implementation of
the Weed and Seed strategy in communities across the country....
1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 118.
119. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Pittsburgh's Hill District Gives Bush An Earful; Urban Plan Is
Called All "Weed," No "Seed," WASH. POST, May 16, 1992, at A14 ("[T]he federal
government has committed $1.1 million for law enforcement but nothing for inner-city
social programs."). Inner-city, anti-drug, and civil rights groups in Seattle recently wrote
the Mayor, "urging him to 'send the money back' on the grounds that it will be used to
fund street sweeps that disproportionately affect black people." Michael Isikoff, Critics
Question Bush's Urban Bottom Line, WASH. POST, May 21, 1992, at A23. Even funds
for academic work have been earmarked for law enforcement. For example, the Justice
Department granted $4 million to a New York University substance abuse initiative, but
university officials threatened to return the grant because Justice Department officials were
restricting their funding to narrowly defined "law enforcement-related" projects. Id.
In 1994, the NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY had "no new initiatives" to
propose for 1995. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 118.
120. See, e.g., CHAIKEN ET AL., supra note 101 at 45 ("Federal resources also provided
police administrators in state and local agencies with justifications to governing bodies in
support of their continued participation in [federal] task forces.").
Of course, the other contributing factor in the states' and local agencies' willingness
to work with the federal agencies is the common perception that the drug situation is
worsening. Id. at 43. Often, however, such motivations may be insufficient to persuade
high ranking officials of one agency to submit to the direction of another agency. Such
interagency tensions have hindered cooperation in the past. Id. at 44.
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local agents the opportunity to work with federal agents on equal
terms, thereby elevating the status of state and local agents.'
Thus, state and local criminal justice personnel are less likely to resent
the federal presence.
Second, the federal government recognizes that generous
remuneration decreases power struggles. The federal anti-drug effort
makes substantial sums available to state and local governments
following the federal plan."z If the President's 1995 budget request
is fully funded, state and local governments will receive roughly $811
million. 3
The timing of the drive for federalization has coincided with a
period of economic hardship in most states.'24 By offering financial
incentives, the federal government has effectively dismantled potential
political opposition to its growing influence over state and local policy
making. To the contrary, state and local agencies consider themselves
the beneficiaries of federal largess. To maximize their intake of
federal dollars, state and local agencies seek ways to become involved
in federal investigations."
The expansion of federal influence also coincides with a self-per-
petuating cycle of political rhetoric that has fed a public frenzy over
drug crimes. In turn, public opinion has justified even stronger
rhetoric and broader policies.'26 In this environment, any dissent
from proposals for broader law enforcement efforts and more severe
penalties is widely viewed as political suicide. Neither state nor
federal leaders dare come forward with objections, even if the
objections are based on federalism concerns rather than substantive
121. This status elevation can be both perceptual as well as real. For example, state
and local law enforcement officers involved in the DEA State and Local Task Forces have
been deputized as U.S. Marshals since the early 1970s. CHAIKEN ET AL., supra note 101,
at 46. The designation confers the broad federal enforcement powers equal to those of
a DEA agent. Id.
State prosecutors can also be designated as Special Deputy United States Attorneys
to enable them to prosecute cases in both state and federal courts. See, e.g., United States
v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 893 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
945 (1988).
122. Money may not buy love, but in this case it surely buys tolerance.
123. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 185.
124. See, e.g., Michael deCourcy Hinds, States' Strained Finances and New Budgets Are
Showing Recession's Toll, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at B6 (noting that states are in a
worse fiscal condition due to the recession of the last several years than in any of the five
previous national recessions).
125. Guerra, supra note 102, at 826-27.
126. See Kaminer, supra note 85, at 102.
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policy concerns. Issues of federalism give way under the weight of
public fear of crime and the states' needs for economic aid.
1. Funding Joint Task Forces
The most potent force drawing states and localities into the
joint drug task forces is the availability of federal funds to employ
nonfederal agents. For fiscal year 1995, the federal government
potentially will allocate approximately $541 million for joint federal-
state task forces.127
Federal task force funding also comes from the federal drug asset
forfeiture program, which now returns forfeited assets directly to the
seizing agencies." In 1984, Congress provided for the direct
transfer of forfeited drug-related assets to law enforcement in lieu of
the previous requirement that such funds be transferred to the general
fund of the United States Treasury.'29 The "equitable sharing"
component of the federal asset forfeiture program allows state and
local law enforcement to receive a share of assets obtained with their
assistance. 30 Equitable sharing provides funds to agencies based on
their level of participation in the investigation yielding the forfeited
assets. In 1994, the federal government will share an estimated $225
million with state and local law enforcement agencies.131 Since 1986,
127. See 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 12-13 (listing FY 1995 budget
requests for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces ($369.9 million), and for
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas ($98.0 million)); id. at 88 (listing FY 1995 budget
request for State and Local Task Forces, $73.2 million).
128. In addition, the DEA assumes the costs of investigative overtime for nonfederal
personnel, costs that could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. CHAIKEN ET
AL., supra note 101, at 45.
129. The Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund was established in 1984 to
collect the proceeds of forfeited assets. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, § 310, 98 Stat. 1837, 2052 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992)). In 1988, Congress amended the civil asset forfeiture statute to provide for this
forfeited property to go directly to law enforcement:
Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this subchapter the
Attorney General may-(A) retain the property for official use or ... transfer
the property to any Federal agency or to any State or local law enforcement
agency which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988). The law had previously required transfer to "the general
fund of the United States Treasury." Id. app. § 881.
130. The forfeiture laws also permit the United States government to share forfeited
proceeds with foreign countries in exchange for international cooperation. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(e)(1)(E) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 1992 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 46
[hereinafter 1992 ANN. RE'.] (observing that the United States shared millions of dollars
in forfeited assets with cooperating foreign governments).
131. See 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 75 (listing 1994 estimate of
equitable sharing payments).
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state and local governments have received approximately $1.6 billion
through the asset forfeiture program alone. '32
2. Promoting Federal Policies Through Direct Funding
The federal government has also garnered state and local support
for its drug initiatives by means of financial rewards and penalties.
The government makes offers of generous direct financial support,
and, on occasion, it threatens to remove funding for noncompliance.
States adopting laws and programs modeled on federal counterparts
receive grant money. National uniformity in drug programs advances
the drive to establish a consolidated law enforcement establishment.
Multijurisdictional task forces make little sense unless the various
jurisdictions are pursuing the same goals in the same way.
Three federal agencies distributed $1.3 billion to the states in the
form of drug grant programs in fiscal year 1990. '33 This represented
over half of the money received by states for drug control." The
grants distributed to state and local agencies fund such things as
community groups,'35 local law enforcement,'36 drug education, ' 37
security measures for schools, 3 ' and drug treatment.
139
132. See id. at 77 (listing Equitable Sharing Payments from 1993 through the 1995
request); 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 130, at 46 (indicating graphically the total equitable
sharing from 1986-92).
133. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY WHITE PAPER, supra note 98, at 2.
To qualify for the drug grants, states must submit applications to the three federal
agencies. Id. at 15. The federal agencies then will decide whether to issue the grants and
will monitor and evaluate the use of the funds to ensure compliance with federal law. Id.
at 15, 29. The majority of drug grant money is devoted to drug prevention and
rehabilitation, and states and localities ultimately have discretion to determine their own
spending priorities. Id. at 4-5, 17.
134. Id. at 2.
135. The President has requested $115 million for Fiscal Year 1995 for the Community
Partnership Program, which provides funds for building and implementing local anti-drug
strategies. 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 6.
136. The Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance
Program distributed an estimated $474.5 million in Fiscal Year 1994. Id. at 104.
137. The DFSCA Governor's Program provided approximately $508 million for
educational prevention activities in Fiscal Year 1993. 1992 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY, supra note 96, at 37, 44.
138. The Drug Emergency Grant Program provided schools approximately $60.3 million
in Fiscal Year 1993. The federal government encourages the use of the funds for "security
personnel, metal detectors and other security-related assets." Id. at 44.
139. Through the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services (ADMS) Block
Grants to the States and other categorical grants, the federal government provides funds
to states on a matching basis for use in establishing drug treatment facilities. Id. at 58-61.
In Fiscal Year 1992, $379 million were made available through the ADMS Block Grant
Program and $248.5 million through categorical grants. Id. at 60-61. The Bureau of
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Although the "block grant" programs give states some measure
of flexibility in designing their own programs, the federal government
strongly "encourages," and in some cases requires, that states adopt
particular programs. In any case, even though the money is in block
grant form, the federal authorities maintain considerable control over
the general direction of state criminal justice policy in several
respects. First, all of the money is distributed through federal
agencies that monitor the uses to which states put the funds, and the
agencies promulgate general guidelines for the types of programs
qualifying for these funds."4  In some instances, the federal
government has begun to attach "strings" to these open-ended block
grant programs, perhaps because states were not conforming
voluntarily to the federal agenda. For example, the law enforcement
grants have required the implementation of comprehensive drug
testing within states' criminal justice systems.141 We can expect to
see an increasing number of policies adopted as conditions for the
receipt of federal funds.
Federal law also requires states to enact legislation mandating a
six-month suspension of driving privileges for anyone convicted of a
drug offense.4 Failure to do so by October 1, 1993, resulted in a
five percent reduction of the state's allotment of federal highway
funds. 3 The reduction will increase to ten percent in 1995.'"
Justice Assistance Block Grants also fund state and local programs for drug treatment of
prisoners. Id. at 72.
140. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY WHITE PAPER, supra note 98, at
15-20 (describing the process by which federal grants are awarded to states).
141. 1992 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 96, at 72-73, 127.
142. The Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C. § 159 (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993),
includes these requirements. 1991 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 34,
at 156.
143. 1991 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 34, at 156. The
constitutionality of this provision could be challenged under the Supreme Court's decision
in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). In Dole, the Supreme Court upheld a
provision that withheld five percent of a state's federal highway funds from any state
permitting the purchase or public possession of any alcoholic beverage by a person
younger than 21. The Court's decision listed four limitations on Congress's spending
power: (1) the spending must serve " 'the general welfare,' " id. at 207 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1); (2) the condition must be" 'unambiguously' "stated, id. (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)); (3) the conditions
must be related" 'to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs' "id.
(quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)); and
(4) the condition must not conflict with other constitutional provisions. Id. at 208. The
Court found that because uniform state laws governing the minimum drinking age further
the federal interest in "safe interstate travel," id., the minimum drinking age condition was
sufficiently related to the federal highway funds to pass constitutional muster.
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The Bush Administration complained that states used federal
funds to replace, rather than supplement, state spending, and it
consequently attempted to prohibit this "diversion" of funds.145
Efforts to prevent states from diverting funds betray an intent to
dictate state policy choices by preventing states from determining how
best to allocate their scarce resources.
C. Use of the Military
The expansion of federal activity has further changed the nature
of law enforcement by increasing reliance on the military to conduct
domestic policing operations. Federal authorities, in coordinating a
national and centralized effort, may call on any of the resources of the
massive federal government, including the Department of Defense
(DOD). Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the military and
federal agencies involved in foreign intelligence have become
available to take part in the anti-drug effort.'46
The Dole Court rejected a state sovereignty argument grounded in the Tenth
Amendment. Since the state could adopt the "simple expedient" of rejecting the funds to
pursue its own policy agenda, id. at 210 (quoting Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947)), the conditional spending provision in no way
constituted federal coercion. The Court refused to accept a showing of widespread
compliance with the condition as evidence of coercion. Id. at 211. The Court noted that,
because the law provided for the withholding of only five percent of the funds for non-
compliance, "the argument as to coercion is... more rhetoric than fact." Id.
Congress would have a much harder time showing that the requirement of a six-month
suspension of driving privileges for anyone convicted of a drug offense is "related" to the
federal interest associated with the highway funds. If it relies upon the same
rationale-that the condition furthers "safe interstate travel"--it will be hard pressed to
show how denial of driving privileges to a drug offender would further that interest.
Moreover, the Court's position-that the denial of a small fraction of a state's highway
funds is not coercive-weakens as the fraction of funds withheld rises. In this case, the
amount withheld will increase to 10 percent in 1995. Presumably, Congress could continue
to increase the percentage until, at some point, the condition would be coercive.
144. 1991 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 34, at 156.
145. 1992 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 96, at 61. The Bush
Administration sought legislation prohibiting states from diverting state funds out of
federally-funded programs. Id. The Clinton Administration has not mentioned this issue
in its National Drug Control Strategy reports for either 1993 or 1994.
146. Eighty-five FBI agents working espionage cases have been reassigned to violent-
crime cases since January 1992. Sharon Lafraniere, Justice Increasing Funding for Prisons,
Agents, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1992, at A21. The Bureau already had transferred 300 of
its foreign counterintelligence agents to violent crime cases. Id. In addition, the National
Drug Intelligence Center has been formed to provide a national system of information for
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. See 1992 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY, supra note 96, at 115.
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Despite legal restrictions on the use of the military for domestic
policing activities such as arrests and searches and seizures of proper-
ty,'47 the federal government involves the DOD in every other
aspect of domestic drug control activity. Of greatest significance, the
DOD has been designated the "lead agency for detecting and
monitoring airborne and maritime smugglers."'" The military's role
in interdiction can be expected to increase because "counterdrug
activities have been determined to be a high priority national security
mission of the Department of Defense."'49
Furthermore, policymakers have proposed that the DOD redirect
its sophisticated military intelligence operations, including the North
American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the DOD's Joint
Task Forces, to track the movement of cocaine.' The DOD has
been charged with coordinating and improving communications
systems for multijurisdictional law enforcement operations. 5' The
DOD is also involved in a domestic marijuana eradication
program."5 2 The "DEA Domestic Cannibis Eradication/Suppression
Program coordinates efforts of Federal, state, and local police, and the
National Guard" in eradicating marijuana cultivation.'53 The
National Guard, under the command of state authorities, conducts air
and ground reconnaissance, tracks suspect aircraft, and assists in other
efforts, including marijuana eradication, cargo and container inspec-
tions, and transportation of criminal aliens and pretrial detainees.'54
The federalization of criminal law in the name of the war on
drugs has done more than merely expand the federal criminal code.
By making even the smallest drug possession case into a federal
147. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988), prohibits the direct military
participation in "purely domestic drug law enforcement-that is, making arrests,
conducting searches, and seizing property." Leroy C. Bryant, The Posse Comitatus Act,
the Military, and Drug Interdiction: Just How Far Can We Go?, THE ARMY LAW., Dec.
1990, at 3, 4 (emphasis omitted). The Act was amended in 1981 to authorize the military
to provide civilian law enforcement with intelligence, facilities, training and expert advice,
and assistance in operating and maintaining equipment provided. Id. at 6. In 1988,
Congress again amended the Act to expand further the military's role in extraterritorial
operations. Id. at 7-8.
148. 1992 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 96, at 104.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 102.
151. Id. at 103.
152. 1991 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 34, at 28.
153. Id. at 28-29.
154. Id. at 30. The DOD also is conducting a program to provide appropriate training
services to federal, state, and local agencies in establishing and operating rehabilitation-
oriented training camps for first-time offenders. Id. at 40.
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offense, Congress has given federal law enforcement virtually limitless
jurisdiction. Congress backs this broadened enforcement power with
the resources necessary to fight a full-scale war. These abundant
resources support the military and the numerous federal agencies that
have directed their attention to the drug war. Federal dollars also
entice state and local law enforcement to join the federal drug
enforcement effort. In the fight against drugs, therefore, the federal
government is effectively the only government.
IV. THE LAW OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AS APPLIED TO
SUCCESSIVE FEDERAL-STATE PROSECUTIONS IN DRUG CASES
Theory and reality diverge in double jeopardy law as it relates to
successive or dual prosecutions, especially in the context of multijuris-
dictional drug law enforcement. Since federal law and state codes
now respond to the same drug offenses, every drug offense is likely
to violate two penal codes."5 For example, possession of cocaine
is a crime in every state and under federal law."6 This parallel
coding raises the possibility of multiple prosecutions in all drug cases.
The purpose of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause
is to protect individuals from multiple prosecutions or punishments for
the same offense. 7 As the United States Supreme Court has
declared:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the
State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
155. See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
156. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Minimum Quantity Of Drug Required To
Support Claim That Defendant Is Guilty Of Criminal Possession of Drug Under State Law,
4 A.L.R.5TH 1, 24-25 (1992). In fact, to promote uniformity between federal and state
provisions, most statutes are modeled after federal law. See Veilleux, supra, at 24. The
state statutes are modeled after the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, id. at 24, which,
in turn, was modeled after the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971
(1988, Supp. IV 1992, & Supp. V 1993), with the purpose of achieving uniformity between
federal and state drug laws. Veilleux, supra, at 24.
157. The Double Jeopardy Clause clearly protects against three types of abuses of
prosecutorial power: "a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same
offense." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989); accord Illinois v. Vitale, 447
U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on different grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794
(1989). The common law recognized defenses for successive prosecutions for both
previous acquittals and convictions. These were the plea of autre fois acquit (previously
acquitted) and the plea of autrefois convict (previously convicted). See Murchison, supra
note 9, at 385.
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to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a con-
tinuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.
158
This guarantee applies equally to a successive prosecution
following a conviction or an acquittal. 9 In successive prosecutions,
"the guarantee serves 'a constitutional policy of finality for the
defendant's benefit.' "" Yet, with only rare exceptions, the rule of
double jeopardy permits the federal government and a state govern-
ment to prosecute an individual successively for the same offense.
The law may even permit federal and state officials to prosecute
an individual simultaneously for the same offense. 6' Besides the
concerns about "embarrassment, expense and ordeal"'62 that attend
successive prosecutions, dual prosecutions impose other substantial
hardships on defendants. When an individual faces indictments in two
courts at the same time, her defense attorney must negotiate the case
with two prosecutors. The process of trilateral negotiation is, by
definition, more complex. Unlike the ordinary single indictment case,
the defense attorney handling dual prosecutions effectively cannot
enter into plea bargain negotiations unless both prosecutors will agree
to terms acceptable to the defendant and, usually, unless they agree
to concurrent sentences as well. If a defendant were instead to
158. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) (citing Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
159. See supra note 157.
160. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
161. Nothing in the reasoning of the dual sovereignty doctrine requires that one
sovereign must wait until the other has completed its prosecution before initiating similar
charges. See infra notes 201-37 and accompanying text.
162. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
163. Sound defense strategy calls for simultaneous plea bargaining with both
prosecutors, or if that is not possible, it may be necessary to request trials in both
jurisdictions. For example, a defendant facing maximum sentences of 20 and 10 years in
state and federal courts, respectively, might agree to plead guilty in both courts in
exchange for a sentence of 15 years on the state charge and 10 years or less on the federal
charge, but only if the sentences will be served concurrently. If either of the prosecutors
will not agree to such a bargain, the defendant may be better off going to trial on both
charges, depending, of course, on the probabilities of conviction which will vary from case
to case.
Unfortunately, even if the prosecutors do agree that sentences should run concur-
rently, the ultimate decision rests not with the prosecutors, but with the courts and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. Generally, the jurisdiction that has custody of the inmate at
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plead guilty in one jurisdiction and go to trial in the other, the
conviction in the second jurisdiction might then result in a sentence
applied consecutively to the first sentence."' Thus, the defendant
has a strong incentive to plead guilty in both cases, or in neither case.
The likelihood, moreover, that the defense can convince two
prosecutors to agree to terms acceptable to the defendant is obviously
lower than when the defense negotiates with only one prosecutor.
Assuming plea negotiations are not successful, a defendant may feel
"squeezed" by the two indictments so that the only viable course is to
demand jury trials in both cases. Naturally, litigating a jury trial
involves more expense, time, and embarrassment than entering a
guilty plea. Trial courts, furthermore, may not understand the
pressures causing a defendant to demand a jury trial, and may,
therefore, impose harsher punishments.6 The defendant who goes
to trial, moreover, must forego the opportunity to bargain for a guilty
plea on a lesser charge, increasing the likelihood of a harsher
sentence. In determinate sentencing jurisdictions, the law may require
a minimum sentence for the conviction of a charge greater than that
applicable to a lesser charge.'66 Had the defendant negotiated for
a reduced charge, the court may have had greater discretion to
impose a lower sentence. If the defendant does negotiate a guilty
the time of sentencing can determine whether sentences will be served concurrently or
consecutively. In federal courts, the issue is now governed by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, § 5G1.3, which limits the courts' discretion. Thus, in order to ensure that a
defendant facing charges in two jurisdictions receives the sentence he or she bargained for,
the prosecutors must receive assurances from the courts that they will agree to the agreed
disposition and that the sentence does not violate the mandate of the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Rather than go through this messy process, prosecutors will often agree that one of
them will dismiss the pending charges with the understanding that the other jurisdiction
will impose an adequate sentence.
164. See generally Annotation, Sentences by Different Courts as Concurrent, 57 A.L.R.2d
1410 (1958) and Later Case Service for 57 A.L.R.2d 1410, at 457 (1994) (discussing
circumstances in which sentences are imposed concurrently and consecutively).
165. It is common practice for both federal and state courts to impose more lenient
sentences for defendants who plead guilty. While this practice is rarely documented in
writing, the Federal Sentencing Commission, in drafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
sought to establish a system that reflected its use. The Guidelines provide a discount
which amounts to approximately 20 to 30% for what it calls "acceptance of responsibility."
See FEDERAL SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1994
EDITION § 3E1.1 (1993); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1988).
166. This is true in federal drug cases, which carry stiff mandatory minimum sentences.
See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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plea in the second case, then he waives any double jeopardy
claim. 67 This fact discourages defendants from pleading guilty.
The inherent unfairness to defendants and the possibly ineffective
use of resources involved in successive and dual prosecutions have not
gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court, the Justice Department, or
state legislatures. Both federal prosecutors and the majority of state
prosecutors face general prohibitions against multiple prosecutions;
however, the exceptions to these prohibitions are so broad that
multiple prosecutions can go forward in almost any case.
At the federal level, the Attorney General instituted in 1959 what
came to be known as the "Petite policy.' 168 The rule, published in
the United States Attorneys' Manual, prohibits dual or successive
prosecutions "based on substantially the same act, acts or transaction"
unless there exists a "compelling federal interest."'69  The policy
statement explains the purpose of the policy: "The policy is intended
to regulate prosecutorial discretion in order to promote efficient
utilization of the Department's resources and to protect persons
charged with criminal conduct from the unfairness associated with
multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for substantially the
same act or acts."' 7  The policy discourages the "unnecessary
expenditure of federal resources" from dual prosecutions and suggests
that "federal prosecutors should ... coordinate their activities with
their state counterparts."'
7 '
The Petite policy provides explicit guidance for federal
prosecutors to use to determine whether the policy applies. The
policy identifies a number of possible circumstances that would qualify
as "compelling federal interests," thereby justifying dual or successive
prosecutions.171 For example, one "compelling federal interest" is
the pursuit of an enhanced sentence in a case in which the state
offense carries a maximum penalty substantially below that applicable
to the federal offense. 73 The policy also states that the vindication
167. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1989); see also In re Coulter, 860
P.2d 51, 53-54 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that plea of nolo contendere may constitute
a waiver of the right to claim a double jeopardy violation).
168. The policy is named after a Supreme Court case in which the Court acknowledged
the policy. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1960) (per curiam).
169. United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-2.142(A) (1992).
170. Id. § 9-2.142(A).
171. Id. § 9-2.142(A)(1).
172. Id. § 9-2.142(A)(3).
173. Id. Other factors that may call for subsequent prosecution include:
a. Infection of the proceeding by incompetence, corruption, intimidation, or
undue influence (State/Prior Federal);
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of "prosecutorial interests" is greatest in "priority areas of the Depart-
ment."' 74  Priority areas include organized crime and firearms
cases." Presumably, drug cases fall within the category of "or-
ganized crime" cases. 6 Thus, in any drug case in which the
prosecutor can obtain greater penalties in federal court than are
available in state court, the prohibition against multiple prosecutions
may not apply. Because Congress has vigorously increased federal
penalties for drug offenses, it is likely that a state sentence will be
more lenient.'" Nonetheless, even if a fair reading of the Petite
policy should prevent a successive prosecution, the federal
prosecutor's failure to abide by the guideline will not give a defendant
grounds for appeal.7
The vast majority of the states have adopted statutes based on
either the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act 179 or the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act.'" These state statutes, like the Petite policy, are
intended to prevent abuses of multiple prosecutions and avoid the
unnecessary use of state resources to prosecute cases already
adequately prosecuted in federal courts. The language of these
b. Court or jury nullification involving an important federal interest, in
blatant disregard of the evidence (State/Prior Federal);
c. The failure of the state to prove an element of the state offense which is
not an element of the federal offense (State);
d. The unavailability of significant evidence in the proceeding either because
it was not timely discovered or because it was suppressed on an erroneous view
of the law (State/Prior Federal);
e. Fairness to other defendants or significant resource considerations favor
separate prosecutions (Federal); or
L The original indictment was held insufficient as a matter of law or there
was a fatal variance between the offenses charged and the proof at trial
(Federal).
Id.
174. Id. at n.8.
175. 1&
176. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
178. Judging from the number of recent cases in which the Petite policy was violated,
the policy appears to be honored more often in the breach. See, e.g., United States v.
Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031,1037 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469,475
(5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gourley, 835 F.2d 249, 251 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1010 (1988); United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 536-37 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Padilla, 589 F.2d 481, 484-85 (10th Cir. 1978);
United States v. 1606 Butterfield Road, 786 F. Supp. 1497, 1506 (N.D. Iowa 1991); United
States v. Byars, 762 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1991).
179. UNiF. NARcoTic DRUG AcT § 21, 9B U.L.A. 284 (1958).
180. UNto. CONTROLLED SuBSTANCEs Acr § 418, 9 U.L.A. 596 (1990).
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statutes (and it is virtually identical in the forty-eight states that have
them) creates exceptions so broad that prosecutors have the ability to
reprosecute in practically all cases.
181
The following sections examine the two grounds of decision
relating to double jeopardy claims in successive and dual federal-state
prosecutions: the Blockburger "same offense" test and the doctrine
of "dual sovereignty." Through the operation of these two legal
doctrines, prosecutors have the theoretical ability to bring two
prosecutions for every drug offense- -an ability they increasingly
exercise.
A. Double Jeopardy Only Applies to Successive Prosecutions for the
"Same Offense"
If two jurisdictions choose to prosecute an individual for two
different offenses, the double jeopardy guarantee does not come into
play, because double jeopardy applies only to multiple prosecutions
for the "same offense." The courts have defined "same offense,"
however, to permit a second prosecution for conduct based on the
same criminal act or transaction. In effect, offenses that seem the
181. The New Jersey statute provides a good example:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of
this State and of the United States, a prosecution in the District Court of the
United States is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the
following circumstances:
a. The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction, or in an
improper termination as defined in section 2C:1-9 and the subsequent prosecution
is based on the same conduct, unless (1) the offense of which the defendant was
formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently
prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law
defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different
harm or evil or (2) the offense for which the defendant is subsequently
prosecuted is intended to prevent a substantially more serious harm or evil than
the offense of which he was formerly convicted or acquitted or (3) the second
offense was not consummated when the former trial began....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-11 (West 1982). Statutes such as this allow successive prosecutions
for the same offense if the state courts find that the two statutes are intended to prevent
a substantially different or more serious harm or evil. See, e.g., People v. Esch, 786 P.2d
462, 465-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Ashrue, 601 A.2d 265, 266-67 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991); State v. King, 522 A.2d 455,459 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); People
v. Cooper, 541 N.Y.S.2d 713,714 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). Other statutes, such as the Georgia
statute, omit the exception for offenses intended to prevent a "substantially more serious"
or "substantially different" harm or evil. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-8(c) (1992). The State
of Michigan bars successive prosecutions as a matter of state constitutional law. See
People v. Bero, 425 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
182. Prosecutors lack the resources, of course, to engage in multiple prosecutions in
most cases.
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same are said to be different. Even if a defendant only sells one
quantity of drugs to one person, the courts may find that the statutes
differ enough that the two jurisdictions actually are not prosecuting
the "same offense." This, of course, comes as a surprise to defen-
dants who assume that one transaction is only one crime.
Of course, federal appellate courts reviewing convictions resulting
from state prosecutions need not address this issue. The dual
sovereignty doctrine permits successive prosecutions for the same
offense.183 Most states, however, have enacted laws that bar succes-
sive prosecutions for offenses already prosecuted in federal court.' 4
Thus, when state prosecutions follow federal prosecutions, the state
courts must determine whether the offenses are the same." 5 State
courts have looked to Supreme Court case law for guidance in
determining whether two offenses are the "same offense."
The Supreme Court set forth an approach for interpreting the
phrase "same offense" in Blockburger v. United States."6 The
Blockburger decision states that "the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not."'" To satisfy this
test, prosecutors were able to fashion two indictments based on the
same act or transaction, each charging an offense requiring proof of
at least one element not required in the other." The double
jeopardy prohibition was easily subverted.
183. See infra notes 202-39 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
185. Federal courts reviewing successive prosecutions by the federal government
following prosecution by one of its territories or the District of Columbia must also
address this issue, as the dual sovereignty doctrine does not apply. See, e.g., United States
v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1153-58 (11th Cir.) (permitting federal prosecution following
acquittal in Puerto Rico), modified, 3 F.3d 366 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1051 (1994); United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186,1193 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (prohibiting
multiple prosecutions in District of Columbia and federal court), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
471 (1992); United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531,535 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 918 (1980); Government of Virgin Islands v. Foster, 734 F. Supp. 210, 212-13
(D.V.I.) (prohibiting multiple prosecutions in Virgin Islands and federal court), affd, 922
F.2d 831 (3d Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1167-68
(1st Cir. 1987) (permitting multiple prosecutions in federal court and Puerto Rico), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1034 (1988).
186. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
187. Id. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)); see also
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,168-69 (1977) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
prosecution for a lesser included offense and a greater offense).
188. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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The Court's decision in Grady v. Corbin"8 9 eliminated this
avenue to multiple prosecutions, but the Grady rule was short-lived.
In Grady, the Court created a second double jeopardy requirement:
even if the offenses satisfied the Blockburger test, the Double
Jeopardy Clause also barred any subsequent prosecution in which the
charge required proof of "conduct that constitutes an offense for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted."' 90 This test, in
turn, received criticism for its expansive breadth.19
In United States v. Dixon" the Court abandoned an analysis of
the actual conduct involved and returned to Blockburger's technical
analysis of the elements of the statutes charged. Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated that, unlike the Blockburger test, the
Grady "same conduct" rule "lacks constitutional roots''9 3 and is
"wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and with
the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy.'
9 4
By returning to the Blockburger test, the Court effectively
eliminated double jeopardy claims in many cases in which a common-
sense understanding of the phrase "same offense" might dictate the
opposite result. For example, a conspiracy charge based on the same
substantive offense as that charged in the other prosecution is one
189. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
190. Id. at 521.
191. See generally Philip S. Khinda, Undesired Results Under Halper and Grady:
Double Jeopardy Bars on Criminal RICO Actions Against Civilly-Sanctioned Defendants,
25 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 120 (1991) (criticizing the Grady approach and
suggesting it results in chilling impracticalities for law enforcement authorities); George C.
Thomas III, A Modest Proposal to Save the Double Jeopardy Clause, 69 WASH. U. L.Q.
195 (1991) (proposing to narrow Grady's "same culpability" test); Ramona Lennea McGee,
Note, Criminal RICO and Double Jeopardy Analysis in the Wake of Grady v. Corbin: Is
This RICO's Achilles' Heel?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 687 (1992) (analyzing the Grady test
as applied to RICO).
192. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
193. Id. at 2860.
194. Id. The Court took issue with Justice Souter's dissenting argument that a number
of precedents supported the Grady rule. The Court then stated that the rule has also
"proved unstable in application," citing a 1992 case in which the Court was "forced to
recognize a large exception" to the Grady rule. Id. at 2863. The case, United States v.
Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992), permitted prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture, possess,
and distribute methamphetamine following a previous conviction for attempt to
manufacture the same substance. Id. at 1380. The Felix Court justified this result by
finding that "longstanding authority" permitted prosecution for both conspiracy and the
substantive predicate offense. Id. at 1384-85. The majority in Dixon found this
"exception" to be so large as to "[give] cause for concern that the rule was not an accurate
expression of the law." Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863.
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simple way to circumvent the double jeopardy rule. 95 Because drug
operations inevitably involve more than one person, it will almost
always be possible to charge both a conspiracy to commit the drug
crime (which merely requires proof of an "agreement") and to charge
the substantive drug offense itself. 6 Similarly, federal prosecutors
can charge a defendant with a violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requiring proof of two
predicate acts of racketeering.Y The state can then prosecute for
the same conduct as that alleged as a RICO predicate act. State
courts have allowed multiple prosecutions for these offenses on the
grounds that they are not the same offense.9
Some courts have even relied on federal jurisdictional
elements-such as the requirement that a firearm "affected" interstate
commerce-as evidence that the two statutes require proof of
different elements. 9 Thus, the "same offense" standard of Block-
burger, reaffirmed in Dixon, can be easily manipulated by a
prosecutor's selection of charges to prosecute the same criminal
transaction twice in every case.
In those instances in which the offenses are found to be the
same-due perhaps to an oversight by the second prosecutor-state
statutes may, in the rare case, bar a state prosecution following a
federal prosecution unless some other exception applies. 210 On the
195. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 597 (1961) (holding that conspiracy
is not same offense as substantive offense). An attempted crime and the conspiracy to
commit the same crime are also different offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Iannelli
v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); State v. Verive, 627 P.2d 721, 733 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1981).
196. Most state statutes barring multiple prosecutions employ the same test as that set
forth in Blockburger to determine if the two offenses are the same. State courts applying
these statutes generally find that conspiracy and the substantive offense are two separate
offenses. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 354 S.E.2d 3, 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Commonwealth
v. Ramirez, 533 A.2d 116, 120 (Pa. Super. 1987), appeal denied sub nom., Commonwealth
v. Valentin, 548 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1988).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
198. See, e.g., Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 897-98 (Del. 1987); State v. Cooper, 510
A.2d 681, 690 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); People v. Cooper, 541 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714
(Sup. Ct. 1989).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 669 F. Supp. 168,170 (S.D. Ohio 1987); People
v. Covelli, 540 N.E.2d 569, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
200. Infrequently, state courts have applied the statutory bar against successive
prosecutions in cases in which the courts find the state offenses charged are the same as
the federal offenses. See, e.g., Schmidt ex rel McNeil v. Roberts, 548 N.E.2d 1284, 1286-89
(N.Y. 1989); Kaplan v. Ritter, 519 N.E.2d 802, 805 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Helmsley, 566
N.Y.S.2d 223,223-27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Mason v. Rothwax, 548 N.Y.S.2d 926, 929-33
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Commonwealth v. Traitz, 597 A.2d 1129, 1130-34 (Pa. 1991);
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other hand, federal courts may turn to the "dual sovereignty"
doctrine, which simply permits a second prosecution in all cases.
B. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
A finding that the federal and state charges are the "same
offense" does not mean that one of the two prosecutions will be
barred as a matter of constitutional law. The Court has developed a
"dual sovereignty" doctrine allowing successive prosecutions and
punishments by the federal and state governments even in cases in
which the criminal laws require proof of exactly the same elements.
The Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to reverse the long-
standing and much criticized' "dual sovereignty" doctrine. This
doctrine places the vindication of each independent sovereign's
interests over the right of the individual to be protected from multiple
prosecutions for the same offense. Notwithstanding a showing that
extensive federal and state cooperation foreclose the argument that
each sovereign is pursuing its separate interests, the Court has allowed
successive prosecutions.
1. The Staying Power of United States v. Lanza
The Supreme Court established the dual sovereignty exception
to the Double Jeopardy Clause in the 1922 prohibition case of United
States v. Lanza.2" The case involved the prosecution of several
individuals on charges relating to the manufacture of intoxicating
liquor. The State of Washington already had prosecuted and
punished for the same offenses when the United States Attorney
brought charges.
The defendants challenged the federal prosecutions on the
ground that they violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 3 At this
point in time, the Double Jeopardy Clause had not yet been applied
Commonwealth v. Savage, 566 A.2d 272, 273-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). For a discussion
of other exceptions to the statutory bars, see supra note 181.
201. For a list of articles critical of the dual sovereignty doctrine, see supra note 9.
202. 260 U.S. 377 (1922). That Lanza involved a violation of the prohibition laws is
interesting for its parallel to the current use of successive prosecutions in narcotics cases.
One author has suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in Lanza may have reflected
the Court's tendency to favor law enforcement and may also have been influenced by
strong popular support for prohibition. Murchison, supra note 9, at 398. One might say
the same about the Supreme Court's current support of law enforcement initiatives over
individual liberties, and public support of the "drug war" appears to have grown stronger
in the last decade.
203. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 379.
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to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The defendants therefore made their case by reference
to the second section of the Eighteenth Amendment,2°4 which
stated: "The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent
power to enforce [prohibition] by appropriate legislation.""2 5 They
argued that both laws were passed pursuant to the same
authority-the Eighteenth Amendment-and that the Double
Jeopardy Clause therefore applied.2" They claimed, in short, that
allowing successive federal and state prosecutions would constitute
double punishment for the same act.
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, approved successive
prosecutions by the federal government and a state government in no
uncertain terms. The decision affirmed the power of each sovereign
to enact its own laws-a power that existed prior to the adoption of
the Eighteenth Amendment. The Court wrote: "We have here two
sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of
dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory."2"
Thus, the Court reasoned, it follows that each sovereign may punish
for violations of its laws.08 The Court then stated that the Fifth
Amendment only applied to successive prosecutions by the federal
government, since the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights did
not apply to the states. 209 By a feat of semantic magic, the Court
concluded that the defendants were not punished twice for one
offense, but that they had committed "two different offenses by the
same act.,
210
The decision cited dicta of nineteenth century cases which
seemed to approve successive federal and state prosecutions. Oddly,
the Court cited Fox v. Ohio:
It is almost certain, that, in the benignant spirit in which the
institutions both of the State and federal systems are
administered, an offender who should have suffered the
penalties denounced by the one would not be subjected a
second time to punishment by the other for acts essentially
the same, unless indeed this might occur in instances of
204. Id.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
206. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 379-80.
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peculiar enormity, or where the public safety demanded
extraordinary rigor.21'
This is odd, of course, because the Lanza case itself involved
successive prosecutions for the same crime-the manufacture of
intoxicating liquors. One possible explanation for the citation of Fox
is that the Court considered the manufacture of liquor a crime of
"peculiar enormity" justifying double punishment.
In dicta, the decision also suggests a policy rationale for the rule.
The Court posited that a contrary rule, barring a federal prosecution
after a state prosecution, would create a "race of offenders to the
courts of that State to plead guilty and secure immunity from federal
prosecution" in situations in which the state penalties were nominal
fines.212 This rationale often would be repeated in the long line of
cases reaffirming the Lanza decision.
Following Lanza, the Supreme Court has passed upon several
opportunities to revisit the issue of dual sovereignty in the double
jeopardy context. Over time, the reasons for overturning Lanza have
become more compelling, 21 3 and criticism of the rule has intensi-
fied.214 Yet the Court not only has reaffirmed the dual sovereignty
exception; it has expanded it.21 The Court rejected intense federal-
state cooperation as an exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine in
Bartkus v. Illinois.
216
211. Id. at 383 (citing Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410,435 (1847)). For a discussion
of earlier precedents contradicting the Lanza rule, see Murchison, supra note 9, at 398.
212. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 385.
213. Part of the Court's rationale in the dual sovereignty cases of Lanza and Bartkus
was that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the states.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,124 (1959); Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382. The Supreme Court's
reversal in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), made the Double Jeopardy
Clause applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and undercut this
rationale.
Two other decisions in which the Court rejected dual sovereignty/federalism
arguments in other contexts also seemed to call for a reexamination of the Lanza and
Bartkus decisions. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (holding
that state witness granted immunity from prosecution under state law may not be
compelled to give testimony that may incriminate him under federal law); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206,208 (1960) (rejecting "silver platter" doctrine which allowed admission
of evidence in federal court that was illegally obtained by state officials); see also Braun,
supra note 9, at 41-51 (discussing legal developments following Bartkus and Abbate that
undermine the rationales of the these two decisions).
214. See supra note 9.
215. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (permitting successive prosecutions
by two states for same conduct); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978)
(permitting successive prosecutions by Navajo Tribal Court and federal court).
216. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
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2. Bartkus v. Illinois: Rejection of Federal Control of State
Prosecutions as an Exception to Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
On several occasions the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
multijurisdictional nature of law enforcement agencies working
together in the spirit of "cooperative federalism." '217  This
cooperation is most organized and structured in the area of narcotics
enforcement.21 The Court has recognized the expansion of federal
anti-drug legislation mirroring traditional state criminal laws.219
Yet the Supreme Court continues to adhere to its reasoning in
the 1959 case of Bartkus v. Illinois."0 Bartkus represents a further
extension of the dual sovereignty doctrine because the Court for the
first time approved a second prosecution following an acquittal."2
The facts also make a compelling case, for the decision allowed one
government, after failing to obtain a conviction, to "walk across the
street" to the prosecuting authorities of the other government, hand
them a fully investigated case, and actively participate in a second
attempt at conviction.
The majority opinion and Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
paint very different pictures of the cooperation between the federal
and state officials. The majority minimized the significance of this
cooperation, and stated that the two prosecutions were "separately
conducted."'"2  The Court noted that the FBI agent who had
investigated the case gave the state prosecutors all the evidence he
had gathered, including some evidence gathered after the acquittal in
federal court. The "only other connection between the two trials,"
the Court wrote, "is to be found in a suggestion that the federal
sentencing of the accomplices who testified against [Bartkus] in both
217. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1964) (referring to
"age of 'cooperative federalism,' where the federal and state Governments are waging a
united front against many types of criminal activity"); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 211 (1960) (noting the "commendable practice of state and federal agents to
cooperate with each other in the investigation and detection of criminal activity"); Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1959) (discussing cooperation between federal and state
prosecutors, "particularly in the narcotics cases").
218. See supra Part II.
219. See supra Part I.A.
220. 359 U.S. 121. The Court decided another successive prosecution case on the same
day. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 189-90 (1959).
221. For a discussion of the issues surrounding a successive prosecution following an
acquittal, see Note, Double Jeopardy and Federal Prosecution After State Jury Acquittal,
supra note 9.
222. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 122.
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trials was purposely continued by the federal court until after they
testified in the state trial." 2m
Justice Brennan dissented, not on the ground that the dual
sovereignty exception violated any constitutional principle, 4 but
because "the extent of participation of the federal authorities [in the
case] constituted [the] state prosecution actually a second federal
prosecution of Bartkus."'  Such a second federal prosecution
clearly would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The dissenting opinion depicted the federal authorities as having
obtained the state prosecutor's approval to control the direction of the
state prosecution2 6 Justice Brennan outlined the role of the federal
authorities. At the federal trial, two alleged confederates testified
against Bartkus. 7  The defense presented alibi witnesses.? The
jury acquitted Bartkus, apparently accepting the alibi defense and
rejecting the testimony of the confederates 29  Unhappy with the
outcome of the trial, the federal authorities "solicited the state
indictment, arranged to assure the attendance of key witnesses,
unearthed additional evidence to discredit Bartkus and one of his alibi
witnesses, and in general prepared and guided the state
prosecution."P0 The State conceded in oral argument before the
223. Id. at 122-23.
224. Justice Brennan did not reject the dual sovereignty exception. Indeed, he wrote
the majority opinion in Abbate v. United States, issued the same term as Bartkus, in which
the Court upheld a federal prosecution following a state conviction for the same conduct.
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 189-90 (1959).
225. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 165-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Douglas joined in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.
226. Id at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 164-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent disclosed the particulars of the federal
involvement. First, the federal court released the two confederates on bail pending the
state trial and postponed their sentencing on the federal convictions until after they
testified against Bartkus at the state trial. Id. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, the
FBI agent who had participated in the investigation for the federal trial set out to gather
additional evidence to be used at the state trial. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The agent
admitted that he" 'was securing [information] for the federal government,' although what
he gathered had 'gone to the state authorities.'" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He located
an inmate at the jail where Bartkus awaited trial who testified to a jailhouse confession by
Bartkus. Id at 166-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the agent did not
arrange for this witness to meet with the state attorney prior to the day of the trial, a fact
"indicative of the attitude of the federal officials that this was actually a federal prosecu-
tion." Id. at 167 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A federal court also postponed this witness's
sentencing until after he testified at the state trial. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court" 'that the federal officers did instigate and guide this
state prosecution' and 'actually prepared this case.' "I' Therefore,
Justice Brennan argued that the state trial should be viewed as a
second federal trial, which is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.2
32
The dissent examined the extent of cooperation to show that the
second trial was, in essence, a federal proceeding.z3 Neither the
dissent nor the author of this Article intends to criticize the
authorities for working together. Multijurisdictional law enforcement
offers many advantages over parallel, uncoordinated efforts and
should be encouraged. In Bartkus, however, the dissenters believed
that the extent of federal participation rendered the state trial a sham
for a second federal prosecution;' it is the unfairness to the
individual who was prosecuted twice by the same authorities for the
same offense that is criticized' 5  As Justice Black stated in his
dissenting opinion in Abbate v. United States, 1 6 "I am also not
convinced that a State and the Nation can be considered two wholly
separate sovereignties for the purpose of allowing them to do together
what, generally, neither can do separately.' 7
The federal-state cooperation in organized crime and drug cases
differs qualitatively from that described in Bartkus. In Bartkus, the
federal authorities had investigated the case without involvement by
the state, and, after acquittal, proceeded to enlist the State's
prosecutors to retry Bartkus with close federal supervision and
participation.S Contemporary federal-state cooperation in drug
cases involves joint investigative task forces, direct and indirect
federal funding of state and local law enforcement, and institutional-
ized policies on the allocation of federal and state prosecutorial
resources.
The agent also uncovered impeachment evidence during an interview with one of the
defendant's alibi witnesses. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He disclosed this evidence in his
testimony as a rebuttal witness for the state. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). This FBI agent
was allowed, over defense objection, to remain in the courtroom to assist in the
prosecution throughout the trial, although other witnesses were excluded. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 165-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 166-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 165-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
237. Id. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
238. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In either case, the dual sovereignty analysis is the same. Justice
Brennan argued that the state trial was de facto a federal trial because
the federal authorities had controlled so much of the second prosecu-
tion" 9 The multijurisdictional paradigm of drug law enforcement
suggests that federal and state law enforcement and prosecuting
authorities work together as one team with one mutual goal-the
elimination of illicit drugs from our society. When two jurisdictions
join forces in this way, the reasons for granting each sovereign the
power to enforce its laws disappear. The two sovereignties in effect
act as one sovereign; that they represent two governments becomes
insignificant.
3. The Proliferation of Successive Prosecutions
The Court has said that prosecutors should use successive
prosecutions sparingly. In Rinaldi v. United States,240 the Court
reversed a federal district court's decision to refuse the government's
request to set aside a defendant's conviction obtained in violation of
the Petite policy against successive prosecutions.24' In Rinaldi, the
Court noted its "repeated expressions of concern" over the use of
successive prosecutions.242 Citing "the potential for abuse," the
Court stated that" '[t]he greatest self-restraint is necessary when that
federal system yields results with which a court is in little sym-
pathy.' ,243 The Petite policy and the comparable laws of most
states also represent determinations that successive and dual
prosecutions should not be allowed for the same offense except under
rare circumstances.2" Thus, one would expect that successive
prosecutions would in fact rarely occur and only in the most compel-
ling cases.
Instead, recent cases demonstrate that successive prosecutions,
although still a small fraction of the total volume of criminal cases,
have proliferated.245 Perhaps surprisingly, the cases also show that
239. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
240. 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam).
241. Id. at 32; see also supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text (discussing Petite
policy).
242. Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 27.
243. Id. at 28 (citing Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959)).
244. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text. The Model Penal Code and a
once-proposed federal criminal code also prohibit successive prosecutions. See Murchison,
supra note 9, at 413-16.
245. Prior to the 1950s virtually no cases of successive federal-state prosecutions could
be found. By the mid-1950s, however, successive prosecutions became prevalent, especially
in drug cases. See Murchison, supra note 9, at 408. Professor Murchison found "literally
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successive prosecutions often will be brought in unexceptional cases,
even after the first jurisdiction has obtained a conviction and a stiff
sentence.246
dozens of cases since 1959 [in which] federal courts have affirmed multiple convictions."
Id. at 428. Since his article was published in 1986, dozens more federal cases have been
decided. For a small sampling, see United States v. Talley, 16 F.3d 972, 974-75 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Deitz, 991 F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moore,
958 F.2d 646, 650 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 647 (1993); United States v.
Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2945 (1992); United
States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1562-63 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1486
(1992); United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2nd Cir. 1990); United States v.
Echeverri, No. 93 CR 166, 1993 WL 356919, at *2-*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1993); United
States v. Byars, 762 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-42 (E.D. Va. 1991); United States v. Edwards, 669
F. Supp. 168, 169-70 (S.D. Ohio 1987). A computer generated list of federal cases
involving successive prosecutions for drugs and firearms charges alone produces over 100
cases since 1975. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file (Feb. 7, 1995) (search
terms: dual sovereignty and double jeopardy and federal /3 prosecution and date aft 1975).
State prosecutions following federal prosecutions have also continued to be brought
and approved by state courts. See, e.g., People v. Sandreschi, 849 P.2d 873, 875-76 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, slip op. (Colo. Apr. 12, 1993); People v. Esch, 786 P.2d 462,
465-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, No. 86CA1686 (Colo. filed Jan. 29,
1990); Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 897-98 (Del. 1987); Satterfield v. State, 351 S.E.2d
625, 630 (Ga. 1987); Brown v. State, 354 S.E.2d 3, 3-5 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); People v.
Porter, 620 N.E.2d 381, 383-85 (Ill. 1993); People v. Covelli, 540 N.E.2d 569, 574-78 (II.
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 118 (Ill 1989); State v. Durham, 822 S.W.2d 453,454
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Cooper, 510 A.2d 681, 690 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986);
State v. Ashrue, 601 A.2d 265,266-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); People v. Cooper,
541 N.Y.S.2d 713,714 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Meyers, 346 S.E.2d 273,273-74 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986); Commonwealth v. Wetton, 641 A.2d 574,575 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Scarfo,
611 A.2d 242, 259 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 631 A.2d 1006 (Pa. 1993); Common-
wealth v. Ramirez, 533 A.2d 116, 119-20 (Pa. Super. 1987), appeal denied, 548 A.2d 255
(Pa. 1988); State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34,35-36 (Utah 1987); Billington v. Commonwealth,
412 S.E.2d 461,463-65 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); In re Cook, 792 P.2d 506,512-14 (Wash. 1990)
(en bane); State v. Rudy, 719 P.2d 550, 552-54 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
246. Most of the successive prosecutions this author has found involve the indictment
of individuals following their convictions in the other jurisdiction. For a sample of cases
involving state prosecutions brought after federal convictions for offenses arising out of the
same criminal transactions, see Sandreschi, 849 P.2d at 874-75 (concurrent 10-year prison
terms); Esch, 786 P.2d at 465-66 (federal sentence not mentioned); Jackson v. State, 563
N.E.2d 1310, 1311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Durham, 822 S.W.2d at 454 (same); State
v. Buhl, 635 A.2d 562, 573-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (life sentence), cert. denied, 640
A.2d 850 (N.J. 1994); Weuon, 641 A.2d at 575 (one defendant received 8-year prison
sentence; other received 13 years, 3 years parole, and $75,000 in fines); Cook, 792 P.2d at
512-14 (federal sentence not mentioned); State v. Hagen, 512 N.W.2d 180,183-84 (Wis. Ct.
App.) (150-year prison sentence), review denied, 520 N.W.2d 88 (Wis. 1994).
For some examples of federal cases involving successive prosecutions following
conviction in state courts, see United States v. Talley, 16 F.3d 972, 974-75 (8th Cir. 1994)
(36 year state sentence); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1991)
(state sentence undisclosed); United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1023-24 (7th Cir.) (2
year state sentence), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991); United States v. Jordan, 768 F.
Supp. 144, 145-46 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (state sentences undisclosed), affd, 972 F.2d 1333 (3d
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CONCLUSION: MERGING THE THEORY AND REALITY OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY LAW IN DRUG CASES
When successive and dual prosecutions were virtually unheard of,
the unfairness of prosecuting individuals twice for the same offense
under the dual sovereignty doctrine rarely occurred. Tunes have
changed in law enforcement; successive and dual prosecutions are not
uncommon, especially in drug cases. Ironically, the dual sovereignty
doctrine rests on a federalist theory that envisions two separate and
independent sovereigns, each of which has its respective laws that
reflect its unique priorities and interests. The doctrine shows respect
for each sovereign's right to vindicate its own interests without inter-
ference from another sovereign. The irony lies in the fact that it is
precisely in drug cases where this theory least reflects reality. In drug
cases, multijurisdictional drug task forces bring the sovereigns
together in a united effort against a common foe. At least in cases
involving multijurisdictional law enforcement, therefore, the Court
should reconsider its decision in Bartkus. The facts in Bartkus
suggested some level of ad hoc federal and state cooperation, and the
majority and dissent disagreed in their assessment of the extent of
involvement. Within multijurisdictional drug task forces, the
cooperation is extensive and institutionalized. Law enforcement
agencies and prosecutors work together in joint, ongoing operations
funded and directed by the federal government. To insist that the
cooperating governments make a choice of forum for criminal
prosecutions resulting from their joint efforts would neither infringe
the sovereign rights of the participating governments, nor create
incentives for defendants to race to the courthouse of the jurisdiction
offering the best plea bargain.
In the meantime, both federal and state prosecutors should
reconsider the practice of dual or successive prosecutions, especially
in multijurisdictional drug task force cases. The majority of state
legislatures have adopted laws barring dual and successive
prosecutions. State prosecutors should adhere strictly to these laws
and refrain from bringing charges for the same conduct that has been
the subject of prosecution in federal court. Similarly, federal
prosecutors should abide by the spirit as well as the letter of the Petite
policy on dual and successive prosecutions. That policy requires that
Cir. 1992); United States v. Edwards, 669 F. Supp. 168, 169-70 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (state
sentence undisclosed).
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a second prosecution should be brought only if a "compelling federal
interest" is at stake. Not every drug case involves a "compelling
federal interest." If task force members decide to bring charges in a
state court, federal prosecutors should refrain from bringing a
successive prosecution-even if the outcome at the state level leaves
much to be desired. At present, the policy is unenforceable; there are
no penalties for its violation. Thus, it is up to the Justice Department
and the United States Attorneys around the country to insist that
prosecutors abide by the policy.
The Double Jeopardy Clause is not a mere technicality. It
embodies principles of fairness and civility that protect individuals
from the harassment, embarrassment, and expense of reprosecutions.
The time has come to recognize the fallacy of the dual sovereignty
doctrine as applied to multijurisdictional task forces and restore the
protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
